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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Final Judgment was entered on December 5, 2002 [Addendum ("Add.") A 
hereto, Record on Appeal ("R.") 2359-2361]. Plaintiff timely filed its notice of appeal 
to the Utah Supreme Court on December 27, 2002 (R. 2375-2378), pursuant to Utah R. 
App. P. 4(a) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0). The Utah Supreme Court transferred 
this appeal to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue No. 1: Whether the district court erred in directing a verdict in favor 
of defendants on plaintiff's claims for lost profits, without letting the jury consider 
plaintiff's evidence that its net profits equaled its gross profits. 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a directed verdict in favor of the 
defendant, the appellate court views all facts and inferences in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff. Directed verdicts are reversed when the evidence, viewed in this 
fashion, is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff. Nay v. 
General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Utah 1993). 
Preservation of Issue: Trial Transcript ("Tr."), R. 2427-2431, 
pp. 405-411; R. 1301-1319 
Issue No. 2: Whether the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff s claim 
that defendants violated the Utah Beer Industry Distribution Act, Utah Code Ann. 
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§§ 32A~lla-101, et seq., on grounds basis that plaintiffs claim impermissibly sought to 
apply the Act retroactively. 
Standard of Review: Whether a statute is being applied retroactively is 
a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, % 37, 40 
P.3d611. 
Preservation of Issue: Tr. 416; R. 702-711 
Issue No. 3: Whether the district court committed reversible error in 
excluding evidence that Carlson's sales of Squatters beer were much greater than the 
sales occurring after the termination of the Distribution Agreement between the parties 
("Distribution Agreement" or "Agreement") and the appointment of a new distributor, 
on grounds that this evidence was irrelevant to whether plaintiff used its best efforts to 
market and distribute defendants' beer, as required by the Agreement. 
Standard of Review: Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law 
that is reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781, 
n.3 (Utah 1991).1 An erroneous evidentiary ruling will be reversed if, absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. Ortiz v. 
Geneva Rock Products, Inc., 939 P.2d 1213, 1218 (Utah App. 1997). 
Preservation of Issue: R. 1409-1424 
Although there are a number of other Utah cases indicating that it is within the 
discretion of the trial judge to determine relevance, including the Ortiz case cited 
below, fn. 3 of Ramirez is the better reasoned approach. 
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Issue No. 4: Whether the district court erred in arbitrarily awarding plaintiff 
pre-judgment interest on an amount of less than the full amount of the termination fee 
awarded to plaintiff by the jury for defendants' breach of the Distribution Agreement, 
where it was undisputed that the amount of the termination fee was calculable with 
mathematical certainty at the time of defendants' breach. 
Standard of Review: Whether to award pre-judgment interest is a 
question of law, reviewed under a correctness standard. Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 Utah 
App. 5, 123, 994P.2d817. 
Preservation of Issue: R. 1962-1970, 2332-2339; Transcript of 
October 30, 2002 hearing ("10-30-02 Tr."), R. 2432. 
Issue No. 5: Whether the district court erred in finding that plaintiff was not 
the prevailing party in this action under the Distribution Agreement, for purposes of 
awarding attorney fees and costs, despite the fact that plaintiff was awarded a net 
judgment of over $324,000.00 against defendants. 
Standard of Review: Whether a party is the prevailing party in an 
action for breach of a contract is a decision left to the sound discretion of the trial court 
and reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. R.T. Nielson Co., v. Cook, 2002 
UT 11, t 25 ,40P .3d 1119. 
Preservation of Issue: R. 1971-2132, 2316-2324; 10-30-02 Tr. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff Carlson Distributing Company ("Carlson") 
against defendants Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C. ("SLBC"), and Utah Brewers 
Cooperative, L.C. ("UBC"), based on defendants' breach of a Distribution Agreement. 
Pursuant to the Distribution Agreement, Carlson was the exclusive distributor of 
Squatters beer in Salt Lake and Tooele Counties, and portions of Wasatch, Summit, 
Utah, and Davis Counties, Utah. Squatters beer is a micro-brew beer brewed by 
SLBC, which merged into UBC, SLBC's successor in interest under the Distribution 
Agreement (R. 451-487). 
Carlson filed its Complaint on August 4, 2000, and alleged three causes of 
action: (1) breach of contract arising from defendants' wrongful, premature termination 
of the Distribution Agreement; (2) violation of Carlson's trademark rights regarding 
Squatters beer under the Distribution Agreement; and (3) injunctive relief requiring 
defendants to reinstate the Distribution Agreement for its unexpired term (i.e., through 
December 14, 2000). (R. 1-36) On February 16, 2001, Carlson filed an Amended 
Complaint to add a fourth cause of action, alleging that defendants' wrongful 
termination of the Distribution Agreement also violated the Utah Beer Industry 
Distribution Act, Utah Code Ann, §§ 32A-lla-101, et seq. ("Distribution Act")(R. 451-
487; Add. H hereto). 
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In addition to damages and injunctive relief, Carlson sought payment of a 
termination fee required of defendants upon premature termination of the Distribution 
Agreement, and attorney fees and costs as provided for in the Agreement, and in the 
Distribution Act (R. 451-487). Defendants denied breaching the Distribution 
Agreement and violating the Distribution Act, and denied owing Carlson a termination 
fee. Defendants also counterclaimed, alleging that Carlson breached the Distribution 
Agreement by failing to use its best efforts in distributing Squatters beer, and seeking 
damages for the alleged breach. Defendants also contended that if a termination fee 
was owed (which they denied), the amount was $290,617.64. (R. 568-612) 
Pursuant to Carlson's request for injunctive relief, Carlson filed a motion for 
temporary restraining order, which the district court denied on September 27, 2000 
(R. 219-222), thereby rendering Carlson's claim for injunctive relief moot. Thereafter 
Carlson also did not pursue its related trademark claim. 
On January 25, 2001, Carlson paid into Court $12,992.74 owed to 
defendants under the Distribution Agreement (R. 366, 371), the payment of which was 
a condition precedent to defendants' obligation to pay Carlson the termination fee.2 On 
January 25, 2001, Carlson also filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a 
determination that defendants breached the Distribution Agreement, that the termination 
2On August 23, 2002, the district court entered an Order releasing these funds to 
defendants, based upon the agreement of the parties (R. 1957-1961). 
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fee was due and payable, and dismissing the counterclaim (R. 293-363, 379-450). On 
June 26, 2001, the district court denied the motion (R. 779).3 
On June 25, 2001, defendants entered into a stipulation with Carlson whereby 
they admitted that Carlson was entitled to a termination fee under the terms of the 
Agreement, that they had breached the Agreement by prematurely terminating it, that 
Carlson was entitled to recover its lost net profits based on their breach, and that they 
had terminated the Agreement without cause (R. 776-777). These admissions were 
directly contrary to the positions defendants had taken at the outset of the litigation 
(R. 95-180, 568-612), and in opposition to Carlson's motion for partial summary 
judgment (R. 632-651). 
The June 25, 2001 stipulation was read into the record at the beginning of 
trial (Tr. 7-8). Nevertheless, at trial, defendants argued that they were not required to 
pay the termination fee, because Carlson had paid into Court the $12,992.74 it owed 
defendants under the Distribution Agreement, rather than paying defendants directly 
(Tr. 34-35, 37, 801, 822). Defendants asked the jury to award Carlson "zero" on its 
claim for a termination fee (Tr. 801). 
The jury trial on the parties' claims was held on July 30 and 31, and 
August 1 and 2, 2002 (R. 1677, 1678, 1684, 1938). In connection with the trial, the 
district court made a number of rulings that Carlson challenges on this appeal. 
3Most of Carlson's arguments in the motion for partial summary judgment were 
obviated by defendants' admissions in the June 25, 2001 stipulation, discussed below. 
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First, prior to trial the court excluded evidence regarding sales of Squatters 
beer by M&M Distributing Co. ("M&M"), the company defendants retained to replace 
Carlson as a distributor of Squatters beer. This evidence, which Carlson intended to 
use in defending against the Counterclaim, showed that Carlson's sales of Squatters 
beer were much higher than those of Carlson's replacement, M&M (R. 2424). 
However, the court ruled that this evidence was irrelevant.4 
Second, the court granted defendants' motion for directed verdict regarding 
Carlson's claim under the Distribution Act. The court held that the Distribution Act, 
4The court's ruling in this regard is missing from the record. Carlson's motion asking 
the court to determine the admissibility of this evidence was heard on July 25, 2002. 
The court took the motion under advisement and indicated it would issue a telephone 
ruling on July 29, 2002 at 11:30 a.m., the day before the trial began (R. 1662). 
Counsel for Carlson recalls that the telephone hearing was held, as scheduled, and that 
the court denied Carlson's motion on the ground that the evidence was not relevant to 
the best efforts issue. However, there is no minute entry reflecting the July 29 
telephone hearing (Index to Record on Appeal, p. 10), and no other order reflecting the 
court's ruling appears in the record. Counsel for Carlson requested counsel for 
defendants to stipulate to correct the record, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11(h), to 
reflect the court's ruling and the grounds therefor. Counsel for defendants recalls that 
the court denied Carlson's motion, but indicates he does not recall the grounds for the 
court's ruling. However, relevancy was the evidentiary issue the parties argued to the 
court (R. 1409-1424, 1639-1652), and was also the issue on a related motion discussed 
in fn.6 below. Nevertheless, because the parties cannot agree on the basis for the 
court's ruling, Carlson is filing a motion asking the district court to correct the record, 
pursuant to Rule 11(h). Carlson anticipates that the court will rule on this motion prior 
to the time defendants' first brief is due, and Carlson will advise this Court of the 
ruling in Carlson's second brief (if defendants have not already done so in their first 
brief). Carlson will also include in its second brief any additional argument as may be 
necessary, based upon the district court's ruling. 
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which was enacted in 1998, could not be applied retroactively to defendants1 
termination of the Distribution Agreement (R. 1952-1956, Add. C hereto). 
Third, the court also granted defendants' motion for directed verdict 
regarding Carlson's claim for lost net profits. The court held that Carlson, which put 
on evidence of its lost gross profits, and evidence that its net profits were equivalent to 
its gross profits because its costs were fixed, had failed to provide evidence necessary 
to prove lost net profits with reasonable certainty (R. 1952-1956, Add. C hereto). 
In presenting its claims to the jury, Carlson contended that it was entitled to 
approximately $310,000.00 as a termination fee (Tr. 231, 789), and approximately 
$9,000.00 in other damages (Ex. 52). Defendants claimed that Carlson was entitled to 
no termination fee, as discussed above, and disputed Carlson's other damages. 
Defendants also contended that if Carlson was entitled to a termination fee, which they 
denied, the amount was $294,022.56 (Tr. 642). They also claimed $20,990.76 in 
damages under their Counterclaim (Tr. 645). In its Special Verdict the jury awarded 
$294,022.56 to Carlson as the termination fee and $20,990.76 to defendants on their 
Counterclaim (R. 1936-1937, Add. B hereto). 
Subsequently, both Carlson and defendants moved for awards of attorney fees 
and costs pursuant to the Distribution Agreement. The district court denied both 
motions, ruling that neither party had prevailed within the meaning of the Agreement 
(R. 2362-2374, Add. D hereto). Carlson also appeals from this ruling. 
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The district court granted, in part, Carlson's motion for an award of 
prejudgment interest on the termination fee. However, instead of awarding interest on 
the entire termination fee awarded by the jury ($294,022.56), which defendants 
conceded was calculable with mathematical certainty at the time they terminated the 
Distribution Agreement (10-30-02 Tr., p. 30), the court calculated interest based on the 
amount defendants admitted in their Answer ($290,617.64) (R. 2350-2358, Add. E 
hereto). Carlson appeals this ruling as well. 
On December 5, 2002, the district court entered final Judgment in this 
matter. The Judgment awarded Carlson the net amount of $324,466.32, consisting of 
the termination fee, plus prejudgment interest of $51,434.52, minus the $20,990.76 
awarded to defendants on their Counterclaim (R. 2359-2361, Add. A hereto). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Defendants' Wrongful Termination of the Distribution Agreement 
As indicated above, Carlson and SLBC were parties to the Distribution 
Agreement whereby Carlson was the exclusive distributor within the specified territory 
for beer brewed by SLBC. [Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit ("Ex.") 1, Add. F hereto] Carlson 
distributed both packaged beer (bottles) and draft beer (kegs) for SLBC, which sold this 
micro-brew beer under the name "Squatters." The Distribution Agreement became 
effective on December 15, 1994; under Section 3 it had a one year renewable term, and 
it contained provisions whereby either party could terminate it with or without cause. 
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In the event of a termination without cause, Section 3(b) required written 
notice at least 90 days prior to the annual renewal date, December 14, so that the 
Agreement would terminate on December 14. In the event that SLBC terminated the 
Agreement without cause, Carlson was entitled to a "termination fee," as provided in 
Section 4(d) of the Agreement. 
The amount of the termination fee was .75 times Carlson's gross profit on the 
sale of the beer during the 12 month period immediately preceding notice of 
termination. The termination fee was due within 30 days after Carlson delivered to 
SLBC certain money and property required by Section 4(c) of the Agreement. As 
indicated above, on January 25, 2001, Carlson paid into Court the $12,992.74 it owed 
SLBC under Section 4(c) (R. 366, 371), and the termination fee became due on 
February 24, 2001. 
Under Sections 10(a) of the Agreement, Carlson had the right to use the 
Squatters trademarks for purposes of distributing the beer. Under Section 16(h) of the 
Agreement: "If any action is brought by either party in respect to its rights under this 
Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and court 
costs as determined by the Court." 
In April 2000, SLBC's micro-brewing operation merged with that of another 
local brewery, Schirf Brewing Co. ("Schirf"), which sold beer under the name 
"Wasatch." (Ex. 2) Defendant UBC was the merged entity, and SLBC assigned its 
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rights and obligations under the Distribution Agreement to UBC (R. 447). UBC began 
selling both Wasatch and Squatters beers, and Carlson continued to distribute Squatters 
beer. (Tr. 52) 
On July 28, 2000, SL$C notified Carlson that it was terminating the 
Agreement without cause. (Ex. 3) However, SLBC's notice terminated the Agreement 
effective July 31, 2000-not December 14, 2000 as per the Agreement. On August 1, 
2000, UBC began using Carlson's competitor, M&M, to distribute Squatters beer. 
M&M was also the distributor for Wasatch beer. (Tr. 51) 
B. Carlson's Evidence of Lost Profits from Defendants1 
Wrongful Termination 
Carlson's evidence of its lost profits from defendants' wrongful termination 
of the Distribution Agreement is contained in Exhibit 28 (Add. G hereto, received at 
Tr. 75), and the testimony of its president, Dick Carlson (Tr. 38, 70-76, 224-229). 
This evidence showed lost profits of $182,444.50, calculated as follows: 
1. First, Carlson compared its sales of Squatters beer in January 
through June 1999, with its sales for the same period in January through June 
• 2000.5 Thus, as shown on Section I of Ex. 28, the sale of full strength cases 
(i.e., beer containing an alcohol content greater than 3.2% by weight) was up 
5Carlson used January through June, rather than through the date of termination at the 
end of July 2000, because July 2000 was not a representative month, due to the fact 
that defendants reduced the supply of Squatters beer to Carlson in that month. (Tr. 52-
53, 60) 
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by 8%, the sale of packaged 3.2 beer (i.e., beer containing an alcohol content 
of 3.2% or less, which is regulated differently in Utah than the stronger beer) 
was up by 40%, and the sale of draft beer was down by 20.53%. 
2. Next, Carlson took its actual sales of Squatters beer for July 
through December 1999 and applied the applicable 2000 percentage increases 
or decreases. For example, in Section II.a of Ex. 28, Carlson shows July 
through December 1999 sales of 1403 full strength cases, multiplied by the 
8% increase in the first six months of 2000 equals projected sales of 1515 
cases. With a profit margin of $3.61 per case, Carlson's projected sales 
would have resulted in $5,469.15 in profits (on sales of full strength cases) 
for July through December 2000. In Section II.b and c of Ex. 28, Carlson 
made the same calculations for both 3.2 packaged beer (including a 
calculation for both 6-pack cases and 12-pack cases), and draft beer, 
respectively. Thus, Carlson's projected total profit for July through 
December 2000 was $265,798.35, as shown at the end of Section II in 
Ex. 28. 
3. The July through December 2000 projected profit of $265,798.35 
divided by six months equals $44,299.73 per month. $44,299.73 per month 
multiplied by the four and one-half months left under the Distribution 
Agreement at the time of defendants' wrongful termination (i.e., July 31 
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through December 15, 2000) equals $199.348.50 as shown in Section III of 
Ex. 28. 
4. From the $199,348.50 in lost profits from July 31 through 
December 15, 2000, Carlson subtracted the profit it made on sales of 
substitute micro-brew beer (i.e., Boulder draft beer, Park City draft beer and 
Moab draft beer) during the same period, as shown in Section IV of Ex. 28. 
For example, in Section IV.a, Carlson sold 52 kegs of Boulder draft beer, 
with a profit margin of $27.00 per keg, for a total of $1,404.00 from July 31 
through December 15, 2000. Carlson made the same calculations for Park 
City draft beer and Moab draft beer in Sections IV.b and c, respectively. 
Thus, the total profits from the sale of these three substitute beers during 
July 31 through December 15, 2000 was $16,903.10, as shown at the end of 
Section IV. 
5. Accordingly, Carlson's total lost profit as shown in Section V of 
Ex. 28 was $199348.50 minus $16,903.10, which equals $182,444.50. 
Although this amount represented lost gross profit, Dick Carlson explained 
why this amount also equalled lost net profit, because Carlson had no cost savings as 
the result of the loss of the Squatters product: 
Q [By Mr. Ashton] Now, Mr. Carlson, with regard to 
the $182,000 number that is a number that does not 
have, other than the items you've identified, 
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deducted from it, any operating expenses. Why is 
that? 
A [By Mr. Carlson] I did not eliminate or reduce any 
operating expenses. 
Q Explain that to the jury. 
A I did not eliminate any warehousing, any trucks, 
any forklifts, any people. I did not lay anybody off. 
I did not cut anyone's pay. My expenses remained 
constant through the whole thing. There was no 
cost savings. 
Q When you say you didn't eliminate warehouse, what 
do you mean by that? 
A Well, this product amounted to about four percent 
of my sales. I guess, by example, if you were to 
close 10 percent of this courtroom, would it cost 
any less to run the building? You can't get rid of 
that small part. I can't get rid of or eliminate 
l/20th of one person. 
Q Were any of the costs that you incurred prior to the 
termination of the Squatter's distributorship directly 
attributable to Squatter's that would have 
subsequently been saved? 
A Will you restate that? 
Q Well, were there any costs that were directly 
attributable to Squatter's and the sale of Squatter's 
prior to the termination? 
A Were there any costs? 
Q Attributable to the sale of the Squatter's product? 
A That were eliminated? 
Q Yes. 
A No. 
(Tr. 74-75; See also, Tr. 224-229) 
On cross examination, counsel for defendants attempted to elicit testimony 
from Mr. Carlson that if the Distribution Agreement had not been terminated, Carlson 
would have incurred costs in connection with the distribution of Squatters beer from 
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August 1 through December 14, 2000 (Tr. 108-223). However, Mr. Carlson 
consistently testified that the costs Carlson incurred during this period were not reduced 
by the loss of the Squatters beer product; i.e., that his costs were the same, with or 
without Squatters beer. (Id.) 
Counsel for defendants also attempted to impeach Mr. Carlson with his 
deposition testimony and other prior statements he had made. (Id.) However, as will 
be argued below, the cross examination of Mr. Carlson, including the attempts to 
impeach his testimony, raised only issues of credibility, which should have been 
determined by the jury, not the judge. 
During Mr. Carlson's cross examination, he also explained that any costs to 
Carlson that would have been attributable to sales of Squatters beer during August 1 
through December 14, 2000, had already been paid earlier in the year (Tr. 201-202). 
Mr. Carlson further explained on cross examination that any cost savings for gas, oil 
and drivers' time were " . . . too insignificant to calculate" (Tr. 205). 
On redirect, Mr. Carlson testified that after the termination of the 
Distribution Agreement, his drivers continued to service the same customers on the 
same routes, delivering beer other than Squatters beer, as well as other beverages 
(Tr. 224-226). He also testified on redirect that Carlson paid the same amount of 
money to its employees for commission bonuses for the year 2000, as if Carlson had 
continued to distribute Squatters beer after July 31 of that year (Tr. 226). 
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C. The Excluded Evidence of M&MTs Sales of Squatters Beer 
Prior to trial, Carlson filed a Motion to Admit Evidence Regarding 
Subsequent Sales of Squatters Beer and a supporting Memorandum (R. 1409-1424). 
Carlson sought to admit two sales reports (Ex. B & C to the supporting Memorandum, 
filed under seal, R. 2424), showing that after defendants wrongfully terminated the 
Distribution Agreement and replaced Carlson with M&M, sales of Squatters beer by 
M&M decreased dramatically, as compared with pre-termination sales by Carlson. 
For example, these reports showed that Squatters beer sales dropped by 39% 
from August 1, 2000 to December 14, 2000 (R. 1411, 2424). From January 1 through 
June 30, 2000, Carlson sold an average of 8,123 cases of Squatters beer per month. 
From August 1, 2000 to December 14, 2000, M&M sold an average of 5,009 cases per 
month (R. 1411, 2424). Carlson argued that this evidence was relevant to the issue of 
whether it used its best efforts to distribute Squatters beer, as required by Sections 8(a) 
and (c) of the Distribution Agreement, and as raised by defendants' Counterclaim 
(R. 1409). 
Evidence establishing the relevancy of M&M's sales of Squatters beer 
included the following: 
1. Defendants' own expert, Gary Fish, testified in his deposition that 
M&M's sales were one factor to consider in determining whether Carlson 
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used its best efforts to distribute Squatters beer (Ex. D to Carlson's 
supporting Memorandum, R. 1419). 
2. Carlson also proffered testimony from its own experts, James 
Merrideth and Russell Motley, that M&M's sales of Squatters beer after 
Carlson's termination were relevant to the issue of whether Carlson was 
using its best efforts. For example, Mr. Motley would have testified that 
M&M's post-termination sales volumes showed that Carlson was using 
superior efforts to sell the product, and that defendants probably did not 
terminate Carlson for lack of effort. He also would have testified that in his 
experience, the replacement of a distributor has never resulted in a decrease 
in sales volume (R. 1412-1413). 
Nevertheless, the district court refused to allow Carlson to present to the jury 
evidence of M&M's decreased sales, on grounds that this evidence was irrelevant to the 
issue of Carlson's best efforts.6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court's Judgment should be reversed for the following reasons: 
First, the court erred in granting defendants a directed verdict on the issue of 
Carlson's lost profits. The court erred as a matter of law in determining that net profits 
6The trial court had previously denied Carlson's motion to compel defendants to 
produce additional evidence of M&M's post-termination sales performance after 
December 14, 2000, on the same grounds (R. 1255). 
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could not equal gross profits, where, as here, Carlson's costs were fixed, and there 
were no variable costs associated with the sale of Squatters beer, other than some costs 
paid prior to defendants' wrongful termination of the Distribution Agreement. 
The court also erred as a matter of law in making a credibility determination 
rejecting the testimony of Dick Carlson, that Carlson's costs were fixed and that there 
were no cost savings as the result of the loss of the Squatters product. Thus, Carlson is 
entitled to a new trial on the issue of its lost profits. 
Second, the court also erred as a matter of law in granting defendants' 
motion for directed verdict on Carlson's Fourth Cause of Action, alleging that 
defendants' wrongful termination of the Distribution Agreement also violated the 
Distribution Act. The court ruled that Carlson sought to apply the Act retroactively. 
However, defendants' July 31, 2000 termination occurred after the Distribution Act 
went into effect on July 1, 1998. 
Although the Distribution Agreement initially went into effect before the 
Distribution Act did, the Distribution Agreement was really a series of one year 
agreements that renewed annually, and a new agreement went into effect on 
December 15 of each year. The contract that was in effect at the time of defendants' 
wrongful termination was a one year contract from December 15, 1999 to 
December 15, 2000, post-dating the Distribution Act. 
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In addition, the impact of the Distribution Act on the parties' rights and 
duties was procedural, as to which retroactive application is permitted, rather than 
substantive. The same acts that Carlson claimed as a violation of the statute also 
breached the contract, and the remedies Carlson sought under the statute were also 
provided by the contract. Thus, Carlson's claim under the Distribution Act should be 
remanded to the district court for trial or other proceedings (such as a motion for 
summary judgment by Carlson). 
Third, the court also committed reversible error in excluding evidence of 
M&M's post-termination sales of Squatters beer, on grounds that this evidence was 
irrelevant to the issue of whether Carlson used its best efforts in distributing the beer, 
for purposes of defendants' Counterclaim. The issue of whether Carlson used its best 
efforts cannot be evaluated in a vacuum, without comparing those efforts with the 
efforts of an average, prudent, comparable brewer. 
Carlson proffered evidence from both its experts and defendants' expert that 
the sales by M&M were relevant to the best efforts issue. Defendants argued that 
differences between M&M and Carlson, and in the economic climate and product mix 
made any comparison misleading. However, defendants gave no specifics and Carlson 
proffered evidence as to the similarities between M&M and Carlson. Defendants' 
arguments went to the weight of the evidence, which was for the jury to determine, 
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rather than to its admissibility. Moreover, in answers to interrogatories, defendants 
compared Carlson's performance with that of M&M's on the best efforts issue. 
Also, if the jury would have been allowed to see the relevant evidence of how 
the sales of Squatters beer plummeted, after M&M replaced Carlson, it is highly likely 
that the jury would have found for Carlson on the best efforts issue. Thus, Carlson is 
entitled to a new trial on this issue, so that it can present the erroneously excluded 
evidence to a jury. 
Fourth, the district court erred as a matter of law in arbitrarily reducing the 
amount of the termination fee awarded by the jury, for purposes of an award of pre-
judgment interest to Carlson. Defendants conceded, and the trial court ruled, that the 
amount of the termination fee was calculable with mathematical certainty at the time 
defendants terminated the Distribution Agreement, which is the legal standard in Utah 
for award of prejudgment interest. 
The district court apparently felt that Carlson overreached as to the amounts 
of the termination fee it claimed at various times, and applied an arbitrary reduction as 
a penalty. However, Utah law does not allow this approach. Thus, the prejudgment 
interest award should be remanded to the district court with instructions to award 
interest on the full amount of the $294,022.56 termination fee the jury awarded 
Carlson. 
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Fifth, the district court abused its discretion in determining that neither 
Carlson nor defendants were the prevailing party within the meaning of the attorney fee 
provision of the Distribution Agreement. Because both Carlson and defendants 
received a monetary award from the jury, as a matter of law both parties prevailed to 
some extent. 
However, and also as a matter of law, under the prevailing party language of 
the Distribution Agreement there could only be one prevailing party. Thus, the district 
court also erred as a matter of law in failing to apply the net judgment rule. Under that 
rule, Carlson was the prevailing party, because Carlson received a net judgment, over 
and above the $20,990.76 awarded defendants on their counterclaim, of $324,466.32 
(including $51,434.52 in undercalculated prejudgment interest). 
The district court also committed legal error in including Carlson's loss on 
the statutory Distribution Act claim, in evaluating which party prevailed on the claims 
under the Distribution Agreement. This matter should be remanded to the district court 
with instructions to award Carlson $115,000.00 in attorney fees, as the prevailing 
party, which is the amount the court has already determined to be reasonable (subject to 
a possible increase, depending on the outcome of the other issues on appeal), plus 
costs. 
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In addition to the foregoing, Carlson should be awarded its reasonable 
attorney fees and costs incurred on this appeal, in an amount to be determined by the 
district court on remand. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN TAKING THE ISSUE 
OF CARLSON?S LOST PROFITS FROM THE JURY 
In its Order granting defendants' motion for directed verdict on Carlson's 
claim for lost profits (R. 1952-1956, Add. C hereto), the district court ruled that the 
lost profits issue was governed by Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 
1986). Under Sawyers only net profits are generally recoverable, which are "the 
difference between gross profits and the expenses that would be incurred in acquiring 
such profits." (Add. C hereto, f 2). The Court further ruled that Carlson failed to 
provide "proof of the costs that would necessarily be incurred, to arrive at net profits," 
so that its evidence of lost profits was "highly speculative." {Id.) The court rejected 
Carlson's reliance on Distillers Distributing Corp. v. J.C. McLett Co., 310 F.2d 162 
(9th Cir. 1962), a case where, on facts analogous to those here, the court found gross 
profits equivalent to net profits, because there were no variable costs attributable to the 
generation of the gross profits at issue there. 
The district court here erred in two respects. First, it erred in ruling that, as 
a matter of law, under Sawyers there can never be a situation in which there are no 
costs attributable to the generation of a particular item of gross profit. Second, it erred 
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in making a credibility determination rejecting Dick Carlson's testimony that he had no 
cost savings as the result of the loss of the Squatters product, which was for the jury to 
determine. 
Sawyers does not stand for the proposition that gross profits can never equal 
net products. Instead, Sawyers states: "In addition to proof of gross profits, there must 
generally be supporting evidence of overhead expenses, or other costs of producing 
income from which a net figure can be obtained." 722 P.2d at 774 (emphasis added). 
Thus, Sawyers applied a general rule, not an absolute rule. 
Moreover, Sawyers did not involve a situation like that here, where Carlson 
presented evidence that its costs were fixed, and that it had no variable costs associated 
with the sale of Squatters beer (Tr. 74-75, 205, 224-229), other than some costs paid 
prior to the wrongful termination of the Distribution Agreement (Tr. 201-202). Thus, 
the factual situation here is unlike Sawyers, but like Distillers Distributing, which is 
persuasive authority as to the facts present here. 
In Distillers Distributing, as here, plaintiff was a wholesaler of alcoholic 
beverages, and, as here, defendant was the manufacturer of the beverages. Defendant 
breached its contract with plaintiff by discontinuing certain promotional activities with 
respect to one of the products (Calvert). The breach occurred between July 1, 1952 
and December 31, 1952. The trial court calculated damages like Carlson did here, by 
comparing the number of cases of Calvert sold in the last half of 1952, with the higher 
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number of cases sold in the last half of 1951, and awarding plaintiff its profit on the 
difference. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, applying California law, affirmed the damage 
calculation, holding that although only net profits are recoverable (as under Utah law), 
because the evidence established that plaintiff's costs were fixed, gross profits equalled 
net profits on the facts of that case: 
In awarding damages for loss of profits, net profits and 
not gross profits are the proper measure of recovery. . . . 
But where the operating expenses are fixed, gross profits 
may be awarded as representing net profits. . . . Harry 
Kenney, controller for appellee from 1949 to 1958, 
testified that appellee's operating expenses were fixed 
and would not be substantially reduced because of the 
loss of the Calvert line. This uncontradicted testimony 
sustains the trial court's implicit finding that appellee's 
expenses were fixed and would not have increased had 
the contract not been breached. . . . 
310 F.2d at 163-164 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
The principle of Distillers Distributing has been followed in other 
jurisdictions as well. See, P&M Vending Co., Inc. v. Half Shell of Boston, Inc., 579 
P.2d 93, 95 (Colo. App. 1978) ("Where operating expenses are fixed, gross profits 
may be awarded as representing net profits"); Covington Bros. v. Valley Plastering, 
Inc., 566 P.2d 814, 817-819 (Nev. 1977)(same). In addition "[t]he fact that there may 
have been some slight variation in the expenses is immaterial. The law does not 
require that loss of profits be shown with precise accuracy. It is sufficient if the proof 
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shows the basis for a reasonable estimate." McCollum v. O'Neil, 281 P.2d 493, 499 
(Mont. 1955). 
Here, as in Distillers Distributing, and the other cases cited for the same 
principle, Dick Carlson's testimony was that Carlson's costs were fixed, and not 
affected by the loss of the Squatters product. Apparently, the trial court did not believe 
Mr. Carlson. However, Mr. Carlson's credibility was for the jury to determine, not 
the judge. See, Little America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 
1982)(reversing directed verdict where one of the issues was the credibility of the 
witnesses). See also, Nay, supra, requiring the district court to consider all facts and 
inferences in Carlson's favor, in considering a motion for directed verdict. 
Thus, the district court erred in granting a directed verdict on the issue of 
Carlson's lost profits. That error should be reversed, and the case remanded for a new 
jury trial on the issue of Carlson's lost profits. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT CARLSON SOUGHT TO APPLY THE UTAH 
BEER INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTION ACT 
RETROACTIVELY 
The district court also granted defendants' motion for directed verdict as to 
Carlson's fourth cause of action, alleging violation of the Distribution Act, on grounds 
that Carlson sought to apply the Distribution Act retroactively, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 68-3-3. (R. 1952-1956, Add. C hereto) Although defendants' violation 
occurred after the Distribution Act became effective, the court ruled that the relevant 
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date was the date the Distribution Agreement first became effective, which was before 
the Distribution Act was enacted. 
Even though the Distribution Agreement contains an annual renewal 
provision, the court ruled that the subject matter of this action involves contractual 
terms that were agreed to before enactment of the Distribution Act. The court further 
ruled that the impact of the Distribution Act was more than procedural. 
In Washington National Insurance Company v. Sherwood Assoc, 795 P. 2d 
665, 667 (Utah App. 1990), this Court ruled that a statute could not be applied 
retroactively to a contractual transaction entered into before adoption of the statute. 
However, in Washington National, unlike here, the contract did not have an annual 
renewal provision. 
The district court erred in ignoring the impact of the annual renewal 
provision of the Distribution Agreement [Ex. 1, Add. F hereto, f 3(b)] on the 
retroactivity issue. The Distribution Agreement was not a contract for a term of years, 
with the Distribution Act going into effect mid term. Instead, the Distribution 
Agreement was a series of one year contracts, which either party could terminate by 
giving notice at least 90 days before December 15 of each year. 
In AMCO Insurance Co. v. Lang, 420 N.W.2d 895 (Minn. 1988), the court 
was faced with the question whether an insured's policy incorporated a state statute 
prohibiting the "stacking" of policies. The court held: 
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An insurance policy, like any other contract, is 
customarily governed by the law in effect at the time the 
policy is issued or the contract is made. Since a statute 
operates prospectively unless the legislative language 
clearly indicates that it should apply retrospectively . . . . 
a statute enacted during the term of an insurance policy 
does not usually apply to that policy until the policy is 
renewed. 
Id. at 898 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).7 
Here, the contract that was in effect on July 1, 1998, the effective date of the 
Distribution Act (1998 Utah Laws, Ch. 328, §§ 1, 13), was a one year contract from 
December 15, 1997 to December 15, 1998. At the time the Distribution Act went into 
effect, the parties had no contractual rights, vested or otherwise, after December 15, 
1998, only expectations. See, McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Board, 88 F.3d 12, 
20 (1st Cir. 1996)(no impairment of contractual rights where rights had not yet vested). 
Similarly, the contract that was in effect at the time of defendants' wrongful termination 
of the Distribution Agreement on July 31, 2000, was a one year contract from 
December 15, 1999 (after the Distribution Act went into effect) to December 15, 2000. 
The fact that the terms of the Distribution Agreement did not change from 
year to year is of no moment. The fact is that a new one year contract was made each 
7In AMCO, the legislature had directed that the amended statute at issue would apply to 
all policies 'that are executed, issued, issued for delivery, delivered, continued, or 
renewed' after the amendment's effective date. Id. However, this legislative directive 
merely reflected the fact that a renewed contract is, for all intents and purposes, a new 
contract, as the court held. 
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year, when the parties did not exercise their right of termination. Thus, Carlson was 
not applying the Distribution Act retroactively. See, AMCO, supra. 
The district court also erred in ruling that the impact of the Distribution Act 
on the parties was more than procedural. As discussed in Washington National, a 
statute may be applied retroactively if its only impact is procedural, as opposed to 
impacting substantive rights. Washington National explained this distinction as follows: 
If a statutory amendment changes the contractual 
rights and obligations of the parties, it is substantive. ... 
However, if the amendment merely affects the legal 
machinery by which parties enforce their rights under the 
contract, ... it is procedural. 
795 P.2d at 665 (citations and footnote omitted). 
Here, Carlson's fourth cause of action (R. 461) invoked only two sections of 
the Distribution Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-lla-103(l) and 32A-lla-109 (Add. H 
hereto). Section 32A-1 la-103(1) merely protected Carlson from wrongful termination 
of the Distribution Agreement. Thus, the same acts that violated the contract also 
violated the statute. 
Section 32A-1 la-109 made the Distribution Agreement binding upon UBC, 
as SLBC's successor in interest. However, UBC was contractually bound anyway, 
because SLBC assigned its right and its obligations under the Distribution Agreement to 
UBC (R. 447). Moreover, in its June 25, 2001 Stipulation (R. 776-777), UBC 
admitted it was bound by the Distribution Agreement. 
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In addition, the remedies Carlson sought under the Distribution Act, damages 
and attorney fees, were the same remedies to which it was entitled for breach of the 
Distribution Agreement. Thus, the provisions of the Distribution Act Carlson sought to 
apply gave Carlson no greater rights, and defendants no greater obligations or 
liabilities, than did the Distribution Agreement, and were purely procedural changes to 
the legal machinery for enforcement of Carlson's contractual rights. 
Accordingly, the district court erred in dismissing Carlson's fourth cause of 
action, and this Court should remand with directions to reinstate this cause of action.8 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN RULING THAT EVIDENCE OF M&M'S POST-
TERMINATION SALES OF SQUATTERS BEER WAS 
IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER CARLSON 
USED ITS BEST EFFORTS IN DISTRIBUTING THAT BEER 
Prior to trial, the district court denied Carlson's Motion to Admit Evidence 
Regarding Subsequent Sales of Squatters Beer. The court ruled that the evidence 
Carlson sought to introduce, showing that after defendants terminated Carlson and 
replaced it with M&M, sales of Squatters beer decreased dramatically, was irrelevant to 
the issue of whether Carlson used its best efforts in marketing the beer. Presumably, 
8On remand, defendants' liability under the fourth cause of action can likely be 
determined by summary judgment. It is undisputed that UBC was bound by the 
Distribution Agreement, and that defendants wrongfully terminated that Agreement, in 
violation of both the Agreement and the Act. Damages may be the only issue to be 
determined by the jury on remand. Also, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 32A-lla-
110(2)(a)(ii), the district court should be instructed that if Carlson prevails on the 
Distribution Act claim, it should be awarded its reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred on that claim, including fees and costs incurred on this appeal. 
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the court relied on the arguments defendants made in opposing Carlson's Motion (R. 
1639-1652). 
Defendants primarily relied on Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. 
Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 601 F.2d 609 (2nd Cir. 1979). In Bloor the Court 
adopted, in part, a subjective interpretation of a "best efforts" contractual provision, 
rather than an objective standard of the 'average, prudent and comparable brewer.' 
454 F. Supp. at 266-267. Thus, the court ruled that best efforts were measured by the 
defendant's capabilities, not by the capabilities of others in the market. From this 
ruling, defendants argued that sales by M&M were irrelevant to the issue of whether 
Carlson used best efforts to market the beer. 
However, Bloor noted that there was authority for applying the objective 
standard. 454 F. Supp. at 266, citing Arnold Productions, Inc. v. Favorite Films 
Corp., 176 F. Supp. 862, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 298 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1962). 
Arnold held: 
In ascertaining best efforts we would have to compare 
defendant's performance with the average, prudent 
comparable distributor in the T.V. market. 
176 F. Supp. at 866 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, in evaluating whether the defendant in Bloor utilized its best 
efforts, the court used the objective, 'average, prudent and comparable' standard in at 
least three instances: 
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I find that Guinness-Harp presented Falstaff with an 
opportunity to promote Ballantine products that an 
"average, prudent, comparable brewer" situated as was 
Falstaff reasonably would and should have explored and 
sought to exploit. 
454 F. Supp. at 269 (emphasis added). 
These actions and failure to act were not consistent with 
those of the average, prudent, comparable brewer in the 
same circumstances seeking to promote a beer to the 
extent of his best efforts. . . . 
454 F. Supp. at 271 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, I find that from September 1975 until 
the present, Falstaff has breached the covenant in its 
agreement with plaintiff's predecessor, in that it failed 
without justification to use its best efforts to promote the 
sale of Ballantine products and has neglected to act in the 
manner required of the average, prudent, comparable 
brewer in marketing his product. 
454 F. Supp. at 272 (emphasis added). Thus, even under Bloor, the issue of whether 
Carlson used its best efforts cannot be evaluated in a vacuum, without comparing those 
efforts with the efforts of "the average, prudent, comparable brewer." 
Also, in Bloor, the court considered evidence of monthly sales by defendant's 
predecessor. 454 F. Supp. at 263. The Second Circuit also considered this evidence in 
affirming the district court in Bloor. 601 F.2d at 611. 
One reason the defendants here terminated Carlson is because they wanted 
M&M as their distributor instead (Tr. 340-341). M&M was already distributing 
Wasatch beer for Schirf, the other principal (along with SLBC) in UBC. (Tr. 51) 
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Thus, defendants can hardly dispute that M&M was anything less than "the average, 
prudent, comparable brewer." 
Yet, after M&M replaced Carlson, sales of Squatters beer dropped by 39% 
from August 1, 2000 to December 14, 2000 (R. 1411-1424). From January 1 through 
June 30, 2000, Carlson sold an average of 8,123 cases of Squatters beer per month. 
From August 1, 2000 to December 14, 2000, M&M sold an average of 5,009 cases per 
month (R. 1411-1424). 
Carlson proffered testimony from its own experts that M&M's post-
termination sales were relevant to whether Carlson used its best efforts, that this 
evidence showed Carlson was using superior efforts, and that, in the experience of one 
of the experts, Mr. Motley, the replacement of a distributor has never resulted in a 
decrease in sales (R. 1412-1413). 
Even defendants' expert, Mr. Fish testified in his deposition that M&M's 
sales were one factor to consider in determining whether Carlson used its best efforts 
(R. 1419-1422): 
Q. [by Mr. Ashton] It's one factor that you ought to 
consider is it not? 
A. [by Mr. Fish] It is one factor that you ought to 
consider. 
(R. 1422) Also, in answers to interrogatories, defendants compared Carlson's 
performance with M&M's performance on the issue of best efforts (R. 1412-1413, 
1644). 
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Nevertheless, defendants conclusorily argued that differences between 
Carlson and M&M, and differences in the economic climate and product mix made any 
comparison misleading. However, defendants gave no specifics, and any such 
distinctions go to the weight of the evidence, which is for the jury to decide, not to 
admissibility. See, Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 
347 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1959)(issue of whether evidence was too remote to be 
relevant went to weight of evidence, not admissibility). In addition, Carlson proffered 
evidence as to the similarities between it and M&M, as compared with General 
Distributing, the largest distributor in the area. (R. 1222) 
Defendants also implied, without proffering any evidentiary support, that 
sales data later than that upon which Carlson relied showed that M&M's sales had 
increased. However, as indicated above, it was Mr. Motley's experience that sales 
never decrease after a change in distributors. Again, however, all of these matters go 
to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. 
If the district court had not erroneously excluded relevant evidence of 
M&M's post-termination sales of Squatters beer, there is more than a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury would have found for Carlson on defendants' counterclaim. 
See, Ortiz, supra (erroneous evidentiary ruling will be reversed if reasonable likelihood 
that, absent the error, there would have been a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant). The other evidence with respect to best efforts is summarized below. 
-33-
Defendants offered anecdotal evidence from customers who expressed 
dissatisfaction with the level of service they received from Carlson. (Tr. 425-428, 436-
437, 444) However, Carlson offered evidence that other customers were totally 
satisfied and pleased with Carlson's performance (Tr. 665, 672-673). 
Defendants also cited to declining sales of draft beer by Carlson (Tr. 465, 
Def. Ex. 30). However, Carlson's sales of packaged beer (cans and bottles) was 
increasing (Tr. 271, Ex. 12, 28). Also, Carlson offered evidence that the declining 
sales of Squatters draft beer were due to SLBC's failure to provide Carlson with five 
gallon kegs, which were offered by SLBC's competitors (Tr. 584-586, 696-741, 
Ex. 12, 33b, 33c), and that sales of beer by one of SLBC's primary competitors, 
including draft beer, were also down (Tr. 371, Ex. 12, 33a). 
In addition, while one of defendants' experts, Gary Fish, opined that Carlson 
was not using best efforts (Tr. 615), two of Carlson's experts, James Merrideth, and 
Russell Motley, opined to the contrary (Tr. 704, 763). 
Thus, the evidence regarding Carlson's best efforts was conflicting, and it 
would have likely taken very little additional evidence to sway the jury in Carlson's 
favor. Moreover, the most important evidence by which to measure Carlson's 
performance was sales (Tr. 694-695, 727-728). Thus, if the jury would have been 
allowed to see the relevant evidence of how the sales of Squatters beer plummeted, 
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after M&M replaced Carlson, it is highly likely that the jury would have found for 
Carlson on defendants1 counterclaim. 
In sum, the district court erred in excluding relevant evidence of M&M's 
post-termination sales of Squatters beer. If the jury had considered this evidence, it is 
very likely that it would have returned a verdict for Carlson on the best efforts issue. 
Thus, the Judgment in favor of defendants on their counterclaim must be reversed, and 
the case remanded for a new trial on the counterclaim, with instructions to admit 
evidence on M&M's post-termination sales volumes for Squatters beer. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
ARBITRARILY AWARDING CARLSON 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON AN AMOUNT 
LESS THAN THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE 
TERMINATION FEE THE JURY AWARDED 
CARLSON 
Under Section 4(d) of the Distribution Agreement, in the event SLBC 
terminated the Agreement without cause, SLBC owed Carlson a termination fee equal 
to .75 times Carlson's gross profit on the sale of Squatters beer during the 12-month 
period immediately preceding notice of termination. The fee was due 30 days after 
Carlson delivered to SLBC certain money and property required by Section 4(c) of the 
Agreement (Ex. 1, Add. F hereto). 
The jury awarded Carlson a termination fee of $294,022.56 (R. 1936-1937). 
On January 25, 2001, Carlson paid into court the $12,992.74 it owed SLBC under 
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Section 4(c) of the Distribution Agreement (R. 366, 371), and the termination fee 
became due on February 25, 2001. 
In their Answer (R. 568-612), while defendants denied owing a termination 
fee, they contended that if the fee was owed, the amount was $290,617.64. At trial, 
while defendants again argued that no fee was owed (Tr. 34-35, 37, 801, 822), 
contrary to their prior Stipulation (R. 776-777; Tr. 7-8), they contended that if the fee 
was owed the amount was $294,022.56, the same amount the jury awarded. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Plaintiff's Motion for Pre-
judgment Interest (R. 2350-2358, Add. E hereto), the district court entered findings 
and conclusions as to the above and related matters. In addition, the district court 
ruled: "The amount of the termination fee was sufficiently subject to calculation and 
measurement with reference to facts and figures" (Add. E, Conclusion of Law No. 5). 
This is the standard in Utah for award of pre-judgment interest. See, Bjork v. April 
Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert, den., 431 U.S. 930 (1977). 
Defendants conceded that the amount of the termination fee awarded by the jury was 
calculable with mathematical certainty at the time they terminated the Distribution 
Agreement (10-30-02 Tr., p. 30). 
Despite the foregoing, the district court erroneously awarded prejudgment 
interest only on the $290,617.64 defendants alleged in their Answer, rather than the 
$294,022.56 the jury awarded, as calculated by defendants for purposes of trial. The 
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court ruled: "However, as a result of Carlson's own excessive miscalculations, it is 
only entitled to prejudgment interest on the amount of $290,617.64, which is the 
amount admitted to by Defendants in their Answer and Counterclaim" (Add. E, 
Conclusion of Law No. 7). 
The district court cited no authority for this puzzling ruling, and there is none 
under Utah law. Even defendants never argued that prejudgment interest should be 
awarded on anything less than the full amount of the termination fee awarded by the 
jury (R. 2284-2292). 
Apparently, the district court felt that Carlson overreached as to the amounts 
of the termination fee it claimed at various times (Add. E, Finding No. 14), and applied 
an arbitrary reduction as a penalty. Again, however, Utah law does not permit such an 
approach, which overlooks two facts. First, defendants had the benefit of the use of the 
full amount of the termination fee awarded by the jury, from the time this fee was due 
on February 25, 2001. Second, defendants conceded after trial that this amount was 
calculable at the time they terminated the Distribution Agreement (yet alleged a lower 
amount in their Answer). See, Lefavi v. Bertoch, supra, 2000 Utah App. 5, | 24, 994 
P.2d 817, 822 (prejudgment interest is designed to compensate a party for the loss of 
the use of money over time, and to deter parties from intentionally withholding an 
amount that is liquidated and owing). 
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As discussed above, the district court's prejudgment interest decision presents 
a question of law, reviewed under a correctness standard. Id. at \ 23. This decision is 
contrary to Utah law, arbitrary and capricious, and must be reversed and remanded as a 
matter of law, with instructions to the district court to award prejudgment interest on 
the full amount of the $294,022.56 termination fee the jury awarded Carlson. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
ARBITRARILY DETERMINING THAT CARLSON 
WAS NOT THE PREVAILING PARTY FOR 
PURPOSES OF AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS UNDER THE DISTRIBUTION 
AGREEMENT, WHERE CARLSON RECEIVED A 
NET JUDGMENT IN EXCESS OF $324,000.00 
At the beginning of this case (R. 568-612), and at trial (Tr. 34-35, 37, 801, 
822), defendants claimed they owed Carlson nothing, and instead that Carlson owed 
them. However, the Judgment Carlson received was for $324,466.32, consisting of the 
$294,022.56 termination fee the jury awarded, plus pre-judgment interest (under 
calculated by the Court as $51,434.52), minus the $20,990.76 awarded to defendants 
on their Counterclaim (R. 2359-2361). 
Nevertheless, despite Carlson's overwhelming victory in this case, the district 
court ruled that neither party prevailed, for purposes of awarding attorney fees and 
costs. That decision was just as arbitrary and capricious as the court's pre-judgment 
interest decision, and must be reversed, even under the abuse of discretion standard of 
review. 
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The district court purported to apply factors set forth in R. T. Nielson Co. v. 
Cook, 2002 UT 11, 40 P.3d 1119, for determining who the prevailing party is, and 
entered findings and conclusions with respect to the factors (R. 2362-2374, Add. D 
hereto). However, the court misapplied those factors.9 
In R.T. Nielson, plaintiff Nielson sued defendant Cook for breach of 
contract, and defendant Cook counterclaimed for breach of the same contract. The jury 
awarded Nielson $182,483.00 on one item of damage and $11,509.00 for other items. 
The jury also awarded Cook $19,521.00 on his counterclaim. This verdict resulted in a 
net judgment in favor of Cook for $162,962.00 plus $11,509.00, and pre-judgment 
interest on both amounts. 
The contract had a "prevailing party" attorney fee provision similar to the 
one here in Section 16(h) of the Distribution Agreement, which states: "If any action is 
brought by either party in respect to its rights under the Agreement, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and court costs as determined by the 
Court." (Add. F hereto) The district court determined that Nielson was the prevailing 
9Ordinarily, one would have to marshal the evidence in support of the district court's 
findings of fact in order to mount an attack on those findings. See, Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998). However, Carlson does not dispute the 
court's subsidiary findings, including the findings that all of the claims in this case were 
important ones (Add. D hereto). The only findings that Carlson disputes are that 
neither party prevailed (Finding Nos. 25 and 26). As to those findings, Carlson 
contends that the court erred as a matter of law, where there was a monetary award to 
both parties. Carlson also contends that in this circumstance, the district court also 
erred as a matter of law in failing to apply the net judgment rule. These points are 
argued further below. 
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party and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. Thus, on facts virtually identical to those 
here, the party who received the net judgment was determined to be the prevailing 
party. See also, Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-557 
(Utah App. 1989) (which the district court here also purported to follow, but actually 
did not). 
The starting point in the R.T. Nielson analysis is that, in most cases, 
determining the prevailing party is simple (as it should have been here): 
As the court of appeals noted in Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, "determining the 'prevailing 
party1 for purposes of awarding fees [can oftentimes be] 
quite simple." 783 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Where a plaintiff sues for money damages, and plaintiff 
wins, plaintiff is the prevailing party; if defendant 
successfully defends and avoids adverse judgments, 
defendant has prevailed. Id. . . . 
2000 UT 111 at 1 23, 40 P.3d at 1126. Here, as in R.T. Nielson, plaintiff sued for 
damages and won, with the only slightly complicating factor being the small verdict for 
the defendants on the counterclaims in both cases. 
The most fundamental abuse of discretion by the district court here was in 
determining that neither party was the prevailing party. The reality is that both Carlson 
and defendants prevailed to some extent, but under the contract language here, and in 
R.T. Nielson, there can be only one prevailing party, and here that party is Carlson. 
R. T Nielson did note that there can be situations in which neither party 
prevails, in which case neither party is awarded fees. 2000 UT 111 at ^ 25, 40 P.3d at 
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1127. That situation would have occurred here if the jury had awarded Carlson nothing 
on its claims and defendants nothing on their counterclaim. 
However, that is not what happened. Here, as in R.T. Nielson, and 
Mountain States Broadcasting, supra, both parties prevailed monetarily to some extent, 
and the district court had to choose which party prevailed to the greatest extent, because 
under the contractual language in all three cases there could be only one prevailing 
party. 
R.T. Nielson held that both parties prevailed there: 
At trial RTNC [i.e. Nielson] prevailed on its claim 
for breach of contract and was awarded $182,483 by the 
jury. RTNC also prevailed on its unjust enrichment 
claim ... and was awarded $11,509 by the jury. RTNC 
further prevailed in the sense that the jury found that 
RTNC and Ronald Nielsen did not have a fiduciary 
relationship with Cook. Cook, on the other hand, 
prevailed in the sense that the jury found that RTNC 
breached the Services Agreement as alleged by Cook and 
awarded Cook damages of $19,521. 
2000 UT 111 at if 26, 40 P.3d at 1127 (emphasis added); See also, Mountain States 
Broadcasting, supra, 783 P.2d at 556 (where both plaintiff and defendant were 
awarded monetary amounts, both were considered as prevailing to some extent). While 
the district court has discretion, that discretion is not unfettered. The district court here 
did not have discretion to call both parties losers, when in fact both parties were 
winners to some extent, so that the court had to decide which party prevailed to the 
greater extent. 
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R.T. Nielsen also held that under the contractual language there, which is 
almost identical to that here, there could be but one prevailing party: 
In most cases involving language similar to the 
contractual language before us here, there can generally 
be only one prevailing party. 
2000 UT 111 at 1 25, 40 P.3d at 1127, citing Mountain States Broadcasting, supra, 
(emphasis added). 
Moreover, the contract between the parties 
indicated that attorney fees were to be awarded to the 
'prevailing party.' Prevailing party is singular in form, 
not plural, suggesting that only one prevailing party was 
contemplated. 
R.T. Nielsen at 1 26. Carlson submits that in most cases, including this one, where 
both plaintiff and defendant are awarded monetary relief, and there can be only one 
prevailing party under the language of the contract (or statute), the prevailing party is 
the one that receives the net judgment, here Carlson. The district court here erred as a 
matter of law in failing to apply this analysis. 
Mountain States Broadcasting is not to the contrary. There, this Court held 
that the net judgment rule should not be "mechanically applied in all cases, although it 
will usually be at least a good starting point." 783 P.2d at 557 Nevertheless, the net 
judgment rule there was the determinative point, as a matter of law: 
We hold that in the present circumstances the party 
in whose favor the 'net' judgment is entered must be 
considered the 'prevailing party' and is entitled to an 
award of its fees. 
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that NBA, in 
view of its net recovery of approximately $85,000, is the 
sole 'prevailing party' as a matter of law. 
Id. at 556 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
R.T. Nielson is also not to the contrary. Although it cited to a non-exclusive 
list of factors that may or may not be relevant in determining the prevailing party, 
depending on the circumstances, in the end it too applied the net judgment rule. The 
specific factors cited were: 
(1) contractual language, (2) the number of claims, 
counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., brought by the parties, 
(3) the importance of the claims relative to each other 
and their significance in the context of the lawsuit 
considered as a whole, and (4) the dollar amounts 
attached to and awarded in connection with the various 
claims. 
40P.3dat 1127. 
However, R.T. Nielson did not apply those factors "mechanically," as the 
district court did here, to a situation where not all of them apply. Of these factors, the 
most important one, and, as discussed above, the one R. T. Nielson focused on the 
most, was the first one, the language of the contract. 
With regard to the second factor, R.T. Nielson did discuss the various claims 
by both parties. As discussed above, the court held that both parties prevailed to some 
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extent, and determined that because only one party could be the prevailing party under 
the contract, that party was the one that received the net judgment. 
As to the third factor, and unlike the district court here, R.T. Nielson did not 
address the "importance of the claims," because it had no bearing in a relatively non-
complex case, like that case, and this case. Regarding the fourth factor, R.T. Nielson 
considered the amounts awarded to both parties (i.e., the net judgment), but unlike the 
district court here, made no attempt to compare the amount of the claim with the 
amount of the recovery. 
The present case is not a complex case. Carlson asserted three claims pled as 
four: (1) breach of various provisions of the Distribution Agreement, including the 
obligation to pay the termination fee, (2) breach of Section 10(a) of the Agreement 
granting Carlson the right to use the Squatters Trademark, and (3) breach of the 
Distribution Act. Carlson's fourth claim, for injunctive relief, was really not a claim at 
all, but one of the remedies it sought for breach of the contract, primarily the Section 
10(a) trademark provisions (R. 451). Defendants asserted a counterclaim seeking 
money damages for breach of the best efforts provision of the contract (R. 568). 
The fact that Carlson did not prevail on all of its claims, or did not recover 
the full amount it sought on the termination fee, does not mean it is not the prevailing 
party. Where a party prevails on some, but not all of its claims, and does not recover 
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the full amount of the claims upon which it does prevail, that party is still the prevailing 
party. See, Highland Const. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1981). 
A partially prevailing party is still entitled to its attorney fees, which are 
simply reduced to the extent appropriate to reflect degree of success. See, Mountain 
States Broadcasting, supra, 783 P.2d at 556, n.10 (prevailing party not entitled to fees 
on claims as to which it did not prevail); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 
989 (Utah 1988) (degree of success is one factor in determining reasonableness of 
fees). Thus, in focusing on Carlson's degree of success on the prevailing party issue, 
the district court confused the standards applicable to the amount of the fee, with the 
standards applicable to entitlement to fees, as the prevailing party. 
If there had been no counterclaim, and the only claim Carlson prevailed on 
was the termination fee, Carlson indisputably would have been the prevailing party. 
Because defendants did have a counterclaim, upon which they prevailed, the only 
additional prevailing party analysis required was application of the net judgment rule, 
as in R.T. Nielson and Mountain States Broadcasting. 
The district court here also erred in attempting to analyze the importance of 
the claims in this non-complex case, and in particular the alleged importance of the 
denial of Carlson's motion for temporary restraining order. (Add. D hereto, Findings 
Nos. 7, 8, 24, Conclusion No. 6) That loss became irrelevant, for purposes of a 
prevailing party analysis, when Carlson prevailed on the termination fee issue and 
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received a substantial monetary award, far in excess of the amount awarded defendants 
on their counterclaim. 
The "importance" of a claim for monetary relief is measured by the amount 
of money awarded on that claim. It would have been a different story if one of the 
parties was awarded injunctive or other non-monetary relief that cannot be objectively 
measured. If that had occurred the district court would then have been required to 
assess the "importance" of that non-monetary relief. See, Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co., supra, 783 P.2d at 556, n. 7 [determination of prevailing party may 
be complicated in cases involving "the granting of non-monetary relief to one or more 
parties" (emphasis added)]. 
Again, the fact that Carlson prevailed only on the portion of its breach of 
contract claim seeking the termination fee, is reflected in the amount of the attorney fee 
award, under the degree of success component of the analysis of the reasonableness of 
the attorney fees sought and awarded. Here, Carlson reduced the amount of its 
attorney fee claim substantially based on a degree of success analysis (R. 1973-2132, 
2316-2324). 
Also, although the district court erroneously determined that neither party 
prevailed, it went on to rule on the reasonableness of the amount of attorney fees 
claimed by both parties. The court further reduced the fees Carlson sought, based on 
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degree of success, ruling that a reasonable fee for Carlson (and defendants) was 
$115,000.00 each. (Add. D hereto, Findings Nos. 27-34.) While Carlson does not 
agree with the district court's reduction, Carlson does not contend that the reduction 
was an abuse of discretion. Thus, on remand, Carlson should receive a $115,000.00 
fee award as the prevailing party,11 plus costs (including deposition costs) in an amount 
to be determined by the district court. 
Another fundamental legal error the district court made in its analysis of the 
prevailing party on the claims and counterclaim brought under the Distribution 
Agreement, was including Carlson's claim for breach of the Distribution Act in that 
analysis (Add. D hereto, Findings of Fact Nos. 1, 12, 13, 24). Carlson's claim under 
the Distribution Act was a statutory claim, not a claim for breach of contract, and 
should not have been considered in determining the prevailing party on the claims 
brought under the contract. Section 16(h) of the contract, quoted in full above, 
provides for attorney fees on a claim by a party "in respect to its rights under this 
Agreement" (emphasis added). Even under the district court's erroneous analysis that 
the parties' respective wins and losses equalled each other, once Carlson's loss on the 
The district court's determination of the amount of a reasonable fee award to 
defendants is irrelevant, since, as discussed above, there cannot be two prevailing 
parties. 
nOf course, if, as a result of this appeal, Carlson prevails on additional claims, this will 
further solidify its prevailing party status, and will require the district court to increase 
the amount of a fee award that would be reasonable. 
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Distribution Act claim is removed from the equation, that makes Carlson the overall 
winner, i.e., the prevailing party.12 
In sum, the district court abused its discretion, as a matter of law, in finding 
that neither party prevailed, where both parties received a monetary award from the 
jury. In this situation, the court also erred as a matter of law, in failing to apply the net 
judgment rule, under which Carlson is the prevailing party. The court also committed 
legal error in including Carlson's loss on the statutory Distribution Act claim, in 
evaluating who was the prevailing party as to the claims under the Distribution 
Agreement. This matter should be remanded to the district court with instructions to 
award Carlson $115,000 in attorney fees, the amount the court has already found to be 
reasonable (or a greater amount, depending on the outcome of the other issues on 
appeal), plus costs in an amount to be determined by the district court. 
In addition, under Section 16(h) of the Distribution Agreement, Carlson 
should be awarded its reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred on this appeal. 
Also, in Finding No. 19 (Add. D hereto), the district court found that defendants 
presented evidence at trial that the amount of the termination fee was $294,022.56, the 
amount awarded by the jury. While that finding is technically accurate, it is incomplete 
and misleading. At trial defendants' primary position was that, contrary to its prior 
Stipulation, "zero" termination fee was owed (Tr. 801), because Carlson paid the 
money it owed defendants into court, rather than paying defendants directly (Tr.34-35, 
37, 801, 822). Moreover, even if defendants had conceded that the $294,022.56 was 
owed, or even paid that amount during the litigation, this would not affect the 
prevailing party analysis. See, Mountain States Broadcasting, supra, 783 P.2d at 551 
("for purposes of an award of fees to the 'prevailing party,' sums voluntarily paid 
during the course of the action are treated as if paid by judgment"). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Carlson requests the following relief on this 
appeal: 
(1) Reversal of the district court's directed verdict against Carlson on the 
lost profit issue, and remand for a new trial on this issue. 
(2) Reversal of the court's directed verdict against Carlson on its Fourth 
Cause of Action under the Distribution Act, and remand for a new trial or other 
proceedings (such as Carlson's motion for summary judgment) on this claim, with 
instructions that, if Carlson prevails on this claim, it is to be awarded reasonable 
attorney fees and costs, including fees and costs incurred on this appeal as to this claim. 
(3) Reversal of the court's decision to exclude evidence of M&M's post-
termination sales of Squatters beer, and remand for a new trial on defendants' 
counterclaim, with instructions to allow the jury to hear this evidence. 
(4) Reversal of the court's decision to allow pre-judgment interest only on 
$290,617.64 of the $294,022.56 termination fee, with instructions to award pre-
judgment interest on the entire amount of this fee, on remand. 
(5) Reversal of the court's decision that neither party prevailed in this 
action, for purposes of an award of attorney fees and costs, with instructions to award 
Carlson $115,000 in attorney fees for the period prior to Carlson's appeal (or 
depending on the outcome of the other issues on appeal, a greater amount to be 
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determined by the district court), plus costs to be determined by the district court, on 
remand. 
(6) Award of Carlson's reasonable attorney fees and costs on this appeal, in 
an amount to be determined by the district court on remand. 
DATED this JV day of June, 2003. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
/Idim P. Ashton 
/^James A. Boevers 
Thomas R. Barton 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the d*Q day of June, 2003, I caused two copies 
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF to be mailed, first-class postage 
prepaid thereon, to the following: 
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
Scott A. Call, Esq. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
and Cross-Appellants 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
CARLSON DISTRIBUTING 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE BREWING, CO., L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company, and 
UTAH BREWERS COOPERATIVE, 
L .C, a Utah limited liability company 
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 000906096 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED in this matter as follows: 
1. In an amount of $294,022.56 in favor of Plaintiff Carlson Distributing 
Company ("Carlson") and against Defendants Salt Lake Brewing, Co., L.C. ("SLBC") and 
Utah Brewers Cooperative, L.C. ("UBC"); 
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2. Carlson is also awarded prejudgment interest against SLBC and UBC in an 
amount of $49,842.12 through November 15, 2002, and $79.62 per day thereafter through 
the date of this Judgment. 
3. In an amount of $20,990.76 in favor of SLBC and against Carlson; 
4. This judgment is a final judgment pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 54(a). 
DATED this day of November, 2002. 
COURT: 
Approved as to form 
Medley 
ourt Judge 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of November, 2002,1 caused to be mailed, 
first class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the proposed JUDGMENT to the 
following: 
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
Scott A. Call, Esq. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
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*?rtI£T ~ I-- 7 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT Third Jutici* ~ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY Q' " ' ! ' • • ' • • ^ • • • w 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARLSON DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, 
SALT LAKE BREWING CO., L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company; UTAH 
BREWERS COOPERATIVE, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Case No. 000906096 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
^PwyBwiT 
We, the Jury in the above-entitled action, find as follows: 
As to the claim of Carlson Distributing Company for a termination fee, what is the 
amount of the termination fee? 
A. Did Defendants breach the distribution agreement by raising the price of 
Squatters' beer effective May 15, 2000? 
[_] Yes £0 No 
B. If your answer to the prior question is "yes," what is the amount that 
Carlson was damaged thereby? 
$ O 
3. A. As to the claim of Salt Lake Brewing Co., did Carlson Distributing 
Company breach the distribution agreement by failing to use its best efforts in the sale, 
marketing, and distribution of Squatters beer? 
00 Yes [_] No 
B. If your answer to question 3 A is "no", please do not answer any more 
questions. If your answer to question 3A is "yes," please answer the following 
question: 
Do you find that Defendants waived their right to sue Carlson for this breach? 
[_] Yes [X ] No 
C. If your answer to question 3B is "yes," please do not answer any more 
questions. If your answer to question 3B is "no," please answer the following 
question: 
What is the amount that Salt Lake Brewing Co. was damaged as a result of 
Carlson's breach? 
$ X P , 1 ftp, 7 ^ 
DATED: August J>_ , 2002. 
FOREPERSON: ^.k). 
Add "P." 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg, #3726 
Scott A. Call, #0544 
Jennifer R. Eshelman, #9155 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs 
Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C. and Utah Brewers 
Cooperative, L.C. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARLSON DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE BREWING CO., L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company; UTAH 
BREWERS COOPERATIVE, L .C, a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs. 
The trial of the above-captioned matter commenced on July 30, 2002, at 9:00 a.m., 
before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley. Plaintiff/counterdefendant was represented by John 
P. Ashton and Thomas R. Barton of Prince Yeates & Geldzahler. Defendants/counterclaimants 
were represented by Thomas R. Karrenberg and Scott A. Call of Anderson & Karrenberg. At 
the conclusion of the Plaintiffs case in chief, defendants moved for a directed verdict on (1) 
FJU0 DISTRICT COURT 
T
^d judicfe, District 
W 1 9 2002 
V LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk" 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS7COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON 
(1) PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF THE BEER 
INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTION ACT and 
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Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of the Utah Beer Industry Beer Distribution Act 
("Distribution Act") and (2) Plaintiffs claims for lost net profits for breach of the distribution 
agreement. The court, having considered defendants' motions, having heard argument of 
counsel and having reviewed all pertinent papers on file, hereby makes and enters the following 
rulings: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendants' motion for directed verdict on Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action for 
Violation of the Utah Beer Industry Distribution Act (the "Act") is granted. Even though there 
is an annual renewal provision in the contract, the subject matter of the action involves terms 
that were agreed upon before the Act was passed. The Act would have more than a mere 
procedural impact upon the rights of the parties and its application would be retroactive in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 63-3-3, and there is no express provision in the Act providing 
that it should be applied retroactively. 
2. Defendants' motion for directed verdict on Plaintiffs claims for lost net profits 
for breach of the distribution agreement is granted. Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 
773 (Utah 1986), is controlling. Sawyers expressly provides that only lost net profits are 
recoverable. It defines lost net profits as the difference between gross profits and the expenses 
that would be incurred in acquiring such profits. The Plaintiff was required to prove its lost net 
profits with reasonable certainty. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Plaintiff, the showing of lost profits here is highly speculative because the amount of Plaintiff's 
lost net profits is not determinable from the evidence. The case of Distillers Distributing Corp. 
v. J.C. McLettCo.. 310 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1962) relied upon by the Plaintiff is not the law in 
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the state of Utah. Even in the appellate court's analysis of the Distillers case it is made clear 
that the trial judge did an expense/cost analysis to justify an award of the net amount due. 
Proof of lost gross profits is not a proper basis for a damage amount without proof of the costs 
that would necessarily be incurred to arrive at net profits. Reasonable certainty requires more 
than a mere estimate. Moreover, under the present state of the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the Plaintiff, reasonable minds cannot differ that the Plaintiff has failed to 
prove lost net profits. Plaintiff has shown gross income and that costs were incurred in 
producing gross income up to the date of termination, but not any specifics from which lost net 
profits can be determined. Therefore, the court finds there is no basis for extension of Sawyers 
in this matter. 
DATED: August ' f , 2002. 
BY Tfifffi COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
John P. Ashton 
Thomas R. Barton 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that on August 
•L., 2002, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS'/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTIONS FOR DDRECTED VERDICT ON 
PLAINTDJF'S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF THE BEER INDUSTRY 
DISTRIBUTION ACT and PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR LOST NET PROFITS to be served, via 
hand delivery, upon: 
John P. Ashton 
Thomas R. Barton 
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this day of August, 2002, and following entry thereof, I 
caused to be placed in the United States Mail, via first class, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS'/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON (1) 
PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF THE BEER INDUSTRY 
DISTRIBUTION ACT and PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR LOST NET PROFITS, to: 
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
Scott A. Call, Esq. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway, Ste 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Attorneys for Defendants 
John P. Ashton 
Thomas R. Barton 
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Clerk 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg, #3726 
Scott A. Call, #0544 
Jennifer R. Eshelman, #9155 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs 
Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C. and Utah Brewers 
Cooperative, L.C. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARLSON DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, ] 
a Utah corporation, ] 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, ] 
v.
 t 
SALT LAKE BREWING CO., L.C, a ; 
Utah limited liability company; UTAH ; 
BREWERS COOPERATIVE, L.C, a Utah ; 
limited liability company, ] 
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs. ; 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE CROSS-
) MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 
) AND COSTS 
) Case No. 000906096 
) Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
After the conclusion of the trial of this matter, both the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
Carlson Distributing Company ("Carlson"), and Defendants/Counterclaimants Salt Lake 
Brewing Co., L.C., ("Salt Lake Brewing") and Utah Brewers Cooperative, L.C. ("Utah 
Brewers") filed motions for an award of attorneys' fees and costs. The parties extensively 
briefed the issues and the cross-motions for attorneys' fees came on for hearing before this 
Court on Wednesday, October 30, 2002. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Carlson was represented 
by John P. Ashton and Thomas R. Barton of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler; 
Defendants/Counterclaimants Salt Lake Brewing and Utah Brewers were represented by 
Thomas R. Karrenberg and Scott A. Call of Anderson & Karrenberg. 
The Court, having carefully reviewed the parties' respective cross-motions for 
attorneys' fees and costs and related papers, having heard oral argument thereon, and being 
familiar with the course of the litigation took the matter under advisement. On Monday, 
November 4, 2002, the Court announced its decision in open court, finding that neither party is 
the prevailing party and that neither party is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs. 
The Court hereby makes and enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in 
further support of its ruling. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, dated February 15, 2001, asserts four causes of 
action. They are denominated: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Violation of Trademark Rights; (3) 
Injunctive Relief; and (4) Violation of Utah Beer Industry Distribution Act. 
2. The First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract asserts four distinct claimed 
breaches of the Distribution Agreement ("Agreement") between Plaintiff and Defendants: (1) 
premature termination of the Agreement (Amended Complaint, f 41); (2) improper price 
increase (Amended Complaint, f 42); (3) failing to supply product (Amended Complaint, f 
42); and (4) a termination fee under Section 4(d) of the Agreement (Amended Complaint, f 
46). 
3. Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action for Violation of Trademark asserted that 
Defendants breached § 10 of the Agreement. (See Amended Complaint, ^ 50, 52.) 
4. In the Third Cause of Action for Injunctive Relief, the Plaintiff sought an order 
requiring Defendants to abide by the Distribution Agreement for the remainder of its term and 
to allow Plaintiff to remain the exclusive distributor of Squatters' beer through December 14, 
2000, the remaining term of the Agreement. (See Amended Complaint, f 63.) 
5. Defendants Salt Lake Brewing and Utah Brewers Cooperative asserted a 
counterclaim against Carlson for breach of the Distribution Agreement's best efforts provision. 
(See Answer to Amended Complaint and Amended Counterclaim, Iff 59-67.) 
6. Plaintiff asserted, as an affirmative defense, that the Defendants waived their 
right to sue Plaintiff for violating the Agreement's best efforts clause. (See Plaintiffs Answer 
to Counterclaim, p. 8.) 
7. Early in the case, the Plaintiff sought injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs claim for 
injunctive relief was important to all the parties and substantial nature and, in fact, was a 
significant component in the context of this lawsuit when the case is considered as a whole. 
Significant court resources, attorneys' fees and time were expended on this aspect of the case. 
8. By order dated September 27, 2000, the Court denied Plaintiffs Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction. 
9. After approximately two years of litigation, the trial of this action commenced 
on July 30, 2002, and concluded on August 2, 2002. 
10. At the conclusion of the Plaintiffs case in chief, Defendants moved for a 
directed verdict on Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for Violation of Plaintiffs Trademark 
Rights in § 10 of the Agreement. 
11. Plaintiff conceded the directed verdict on Count II of the Amended Complaint. 
12. Also at the close of Plaintiffs case in chief, Defendants moved for a directed 
verdict on Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of the Utah Beer Industry 
Distribution Act (the "Beer Act"). 
13. The Court granted Defendants' Motion for a Directed Verdict on the Beer Act 
claim because its application would necessarily be retroactive in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN., §63-3-3. 
14. Defendants also moved for a directed verdict on Plaintiffs breach of contract 
claim for lost profits relating to Defendants' premature termination of the Distribution 
Agreement. 
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15. The Court directed a verdict in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs lost profits 
breach of contract claim. 
16. The amount of the termination fee, Plaintiffs claims relating to the May 15, 
2000 price increase, Plaintiffs affirmative defense of waiver, and Defendants' counterclaim 
for breach of the Distribution Agreement's best efforts provisions were submitted to the jury. 
17. At trial, Plaintiff sought recovery from Defendants in excess of $512,000, 
which included its claim for lost profits for premature breach of the termination agreement of 
$182,000, breach of contract relating to a price increase valued by the Plaintiff in the amount 
of approximately $10,000, and the termination fee claim. 
18. The amount of the termination fee claimed by Carlson during the course of this 
litigation varied from $351,842.00 to $323,096.00 to $319,952.66 to $309,864.82. 
19. Defendants presented evidence at trial from their expert certified public 
accountant that the amount of the termination fee was $294,022.56. 
20. On August 2, 2002, the jury returned its special verdict (1) affixing the 
termination fee at the amount claimed by Defendants, $294,022.56; (2) finding that Defendants 
did not breach the Distribution Agreement by raising the price of Squatters' beer; (3) finding 
that Carlson Distributing breached the Distribution Agreement by failing to use its best efforts 
to market and sell Squatters beer; (4) finding that the best efforts claim was not waived by 
Defendants; and, (5) awarding damages to Defendants on the best efforts claim in the sum of 
$20,990.76. 
21. After trial, both parties filed motions for an award of attorneys' fees and costs. 
22. Paragraph 16(h) of the parties' Distribution Agreement provides for an award of 
reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs as follows: "[i]f any action is brought by either party 
in respect to its rights under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable 
attorneys' fees and court costs, as determined by the Court." 
23. Plaintiff's net judgment of $273,000.00, after deducting the amount of the 
Defendants' best efforts counterclaim judgment, amounts to little over one-half of the amounts 
sought by Plaintiff at trial. 
24. The Court finds that the claims that the Plaintiff was unsuccessful on, including 
the injunctive relief claim, the trademark claim, the Beer Act claim, all of the Plaintiff's breach 
of contract claims, except for the termination fee, and the Defendants' best efforts 
counterclaim were important, significant claims. When these claims are considered in the 
context of this lawsuit as a whole, and when you take into consideration the significant court 
resources, trial, and hearing time, as well as the attorneys' time in terms of preparation, trial 
time and hearing time which was expended on this particular case, the only conclusion one 
could come to is that the claims Plaintiff was unsuccessful on were, in fact, significant. They 
were not minor. 
25. The Court specifically finds that the Plaintiffs net judgment rule victory, while 
an important factor, is equal to in quality and significance to Defendants' victories on the 
claims that they were successful on in terms of the quality of the respective recoveries by the 
parties, the resources expended to accomplish those victories and their significance to the 
lawsuit as a whole. 
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26. In this Court's view, neither party is the sole, prevailing party because both 
parties won and lost significant claims and issues and when this case is considered as a whole, 
their respective victories and losses are equal or substantially equal, resulting in a specific 
finding from this Court that neither party is the prevailing party. 
27. Even if the Court were to find, which it specifically does not find, that both 
parties were the prevailing parties, because of the factual differences relating to the separate 
claims, each party would be entitled to recover fees on only those claims they were successful 
on. 
28. Carlson submitted an affidavit of fees requesting recovery of $146,642 relating 
to the claims that it contends it prevailed on. In addition, Carlson also made a supplemental 
request at the hearing of this matter. 
29. Salt Lake Brewing and Utah Brewers incurred attorneys' fees in this action 
through August 19, 2002, in the sum of $144,432.25. Of that amount, the total fees incurred 
on claims other than the termination fee was $115,066.89. Salt Lake Brewing Co. and Utah 
Brewers Cooperative also submitted a supplemental fee affidavit. 
30. As to both parties' claims for fees, the Court finds that the rates charged are 
those customarily charged by comparable firms in this community. 
31. Except as set forth below, the Court also finds that the legal work, as set forth 
in the fee affidavits, was substantially performed and was reasonably necessary to prosecute 
and defend against the claims asserted. 
32. However, the Court finds that the Carlson's claim for fees of approximately 
$146,000, plus the supplemental request, to be excessive and unreasonable because it includes 
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fees for issues that the Carlson was unsuccessful on, beyond those issues which merely 
naturally overlap. 
33. Further, the Court finds that Carlson's claim that 50% of the attorneys' time 
was spent on the termination fee issue, while not made in bad faith, to be incredulous, 
particularly when viewed in light of the significance of the other claims lost by Carlson, 
including its claim for lost profits for premature breach of the distribution agreement, its 
breach of contract claim for increase in price, and the Defendants' best efforts counterclaim 
and the injunctive relief request. There is no way that 50% of the necessary time to try this 
case was spent on the termination fee issue. It is therefore also reasonable to assume that 50% 
of preparation time could not have been spent on the termination fee claim. 
34. The Court does find, however, that the Defendants' claim for fees in the amount 
of $115,000, as set forth in the Defendants' affidavit in support of its' motion for an award of 
attorneys' fees and costs is more reasonable, conservative and consistently satisfies all of the 
factors set forth in the Bracken case. Therefore, if the Court were to find that both parties 
prevailed, which it is not finding, the reasonable fees awarded to each of the parties would be 
the sum of $115,000. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In granting the Defendants' motion for directed verdict, the Court held that the 
Utah Beer Industry Distribution Act (the "Beer Act") did not apply. Therefore, the Court 
concludes that there is no basis for Defendants to recover their attorneys' fees under the Beer 
Act. 
2. The Distribution Agreement between the parties in this case provides for an 
award of reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs to the prevailing party. 
3. In R. T. Nielsen v. Cook, 40 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court 
identified appropriate considerations for determining the prevailing party, which include, but 
are not limited to, (i) the contractual language at issue; (ii) the number of claims, 
counterclaims, cross-claims brought by the parties; (iii) the importance of the claims relative to 
each other and their significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a whole; and (iv) 
the dollar amounts to and awarded in connection with the various claims. 
4. The standard articulated in R. T. Nielsen permits a case by case evaluation by 
the trial court and grants it the flexibility to determine whether one, both or neither party may 
be considered to have prevailed. Of the factors identified by the Court in R. T. Nielsen, those 
numbered (ii) and (iii) are significant in this particular case. 
5. In the Mountain States Broadcasting cases, the court made it clear that the 
mechanical application of the net judgment rule is not required, but may be a good place to 
begin the analysis. In this case, however, I find the mechanical application of the net judgment 
rule to be inappropriate. 
6. Early on, the Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief was important to all parties 
and a substantive and significant component, in the course of the lawsuit, when the case is 
considered as a whole. It consumed significant amounts of court, resources, and attorneys' 
time and fees. Although the Plaintiff recovered a net judgment of $273,000, after offsetting 
the amount of Defendants' best efforts counterclaim judgment, if you in fact calculate the net 
judgment in that fashion, it is important to note that in this case the Plaintiff sought $512,000 
at trial, and recovered little over one-half of the amount claimed. Defendants' were successful 
against a number of claims asserted by the Plaintiff, including a substantial, but novel 
unsupported claim for lost net profits in which the Plaintiff contended gross profits equal net 
profits, despite the fact that Plaintiff's own testimony was inconsistent with this theory. 
Plaintiff valued this claim at $182,000 at trial. Defendants also defended against breach of 
contract due to a price increase claim, which Plaintiff sought $10,000 at trial. Thus, the 
Plaintiff sought over $192,000 at trial on claims that the Plaintiff valued even higher prior to 
trial. Other claims that the Defendants' prevailed on included the trademark claim and the 
Beer Act claim, and in fact, all of the Plaintiff's breach of contract claims, except for the 
termination fee claim. In addition, Defendants prevailed on the Plaintiff's argument that they 
had waived their right to sue for breach of the contract's best efforts clause. 
7. The Plaintiff was unsuccessful on important and significant claims considering 
the context of the lawsuit as a whole. The Court, therefore, concludes that notwithstanding the 
net judgment to Plaintiff, regardless of how calculated, this factor is only equal in quality and 
significance to Defendants' victories on the claims they were successful on. Considering all of 
the relevant factors and the matter as a whole, the Court concludes that neither party is the sole 
prevailing party. 
8. For the reasons stated above, because the Court concludes that neither party is 
the prevailing party in this action, neither party is entitled to recover any attorneys' fees or 
costs incurred herein. 
9. Any finding of fact deemed to be a conclusion of law is incorporated into these 
Conclusions of Law. 
DATED: November , 2002. 
Thomas R. Barton 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that orrNovembef 
2002, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon: 
John P. Ashton 
Thomas R. Barton 
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this day of , 2002, and following entry 
thereof, I caused to be placed in the United States Mail, via first class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, to: 
John P. Ashton 
Thomas R. Barton 
PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Scott A. Call 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway, Ste 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Clerk 
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John P. Ashton(0314) 
Thomas R. Barton (6827) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
CARLSON DISTRIBUTING 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE BREWING, CO., L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, and 
UTAH BREWERS COOPERATIVE, 
L.C., a Utah limited liability company 
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST 
Case No. 000906096 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
This matter was tried to a jury over the course of four days, beginning on July 30, 
2002. At the conclusion of trial, the jury rendered a Special Verdict in which it awarded 
monetary amounts to both Plaintiff Carlson Distributing Company ("Carlson") and 
Defendants. Subsequently, Carlson moved for an award of prejudgment interest on the 
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amount awarded to it by the jury. Defendants opposed Carlson's motion. 
After full briefing, Carlson's Motion for Prejudgment Interest came before the 
Court for hearing on October 30, 2002. Plaintiff Carlson Distributing Company was 
represented by Thomas R. Barton of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler; Defendants Salt Lake 
Brewing Co., L.C. and Utah Brewers Cooperative, L.C. were represented by Scott A. 
Call of Anderson & Karrenberg. Based on the written submissions of the parties, the 
arguments made at the hearing, the evidence at trial, and good cause appearing therefore, 
THE COURT HEREBY GRANTS Carlson's Motion for Award of Prejudgment 
Interest in substantial part, and makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Section 4(d) of the Distribution Agreement between the parties provides for a 
termination fee payable to the Distributor (Carlson) in the event that the Brewer 
(Defendants) elects not to renew the Agreement. 
2. In its Complaint, Carlson claimed that it was entitled to such a termination 
fee from Defendants. 
3. In their Answer and Counterclaim, Defendants denied liability for such a 
termination fee. However, Defendants admitted that if such a fee was owed, the amount 
would be $290,617.64. 
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4. Section 4(d) of the Distribution Agreement provides that the termination fee 
shall be due "within thirty days from Distributor's payment (if any) and delivery to Brewer 
of the amounts and properties required to be paid or delivered under § 4(c) hereof." 
5. Carlson delivered said properties to Defendants shortly after the termination 
of the Distribution Agreement. 
6. The amount owed by Carlson to Defendants under Section 4(c) of the 
Agreement was $12,992.74. 
7. On January 25, 2001, Carlson deposited $12,992.74 into the Court by 
delivering a check, in the same amount and made payable to the Third District Court, to 
the Court. Said deposit was accompanied by an affidavit from Richard Carlson, and made 
in conjunction with Carlson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated January 25, 
2001. In its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Carlson contended that its deposit into 
Court of the $12,992.74, satisfied its obligation under Section 4(d) of the Agreement. 
Carlson properly served copies of the afore-mentioned documents—including a copy of the 
check—on the Defendants. 
8. In its opposition to Carlson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Defendants did not argue that Carlson's deposit into Court failed to satisfy Section 4(d) of 
the Agreement. 
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9. Defendants neither objected to such deposit nor requested that the funds be 
released, until July 31, 2002. 
10. On June 25, 2001, the parties stipulated that Carlson was entitled to a 
termination fee under the terms of the Agreement. However, they also stipulated that 
judgment could not be entered because the amount of the fee was contested and further 
discovery was necessary. 
11. On July 31, 2002, Defendants moved for a directed verdict on Carlson's 
claim for a termination fee and argued that payment of the fee was not due because 
Carlson's payment into Court did not comply with Section 4(d) of the Distribution 
Agreement. 
12. In a ruling from the bench on August 1, 2002, the Court denied this motion 
and held that the Defendants had waived any objection they may have had to Carlson's 
deposit of the funds with the Court. 
13. However, the Defendants put on evidence and argued to the jury that no 
termination fee was owed because Carlson's deposit into Court did not satisfy Section 4(d) 
of the Distribution Agreement. Nevertheless, the Defendants presented evidence that, if 
the fee was owed at all, the amount was $294,022.56. 
14. Over the course of the litigation and during the trial itself, Carlson calculated 
the termination fee in varying and excessive amounts. Carlson also used a method that 
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conflicted with the provisions of the Distribution Agreement, and which resulted in the 
Court's exclusion, at trial, of Carlson's evidence of the amount of the termination fee. 
Carlson subsequently recalculated the fee, and the resulting amount was admitted into 
evidence by the Court. This amount was approximately $309,000. 
15. In its Special Verdict, the jury awarded Carlson $294,022.56 as the 
termination fee. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court reaffirms its decision denying the Defendants' Motion for 
Directed Verdict, referenced above, on the following grounds: 
a. Section 4(d) of the Termination Agreement required Carlson to pay and 
deliver $12,992.74 to the Defendants. Once such payment and delivery was made, 
Defendants were be obligated to pay the termination fee required by Section 4(d) of the 
Agreement. 
b. Carlson deposited $12,992.74 into Court on January 25, 2001, and 
argued that this act satisfied Section 4(d) of the Agreement. Defendants were aware of the 
deposit; they were aware of the terms of Section 4(d); and they were aware of Carlson's 
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position that the deposit satisfied Section 4(d). 
c. Nevertheless, Defendants failed to object to Carlson's deposit and they 
did not object to or request that the funds be released to them until July 31, 2002— 
approximately 17 months after the deposit. 
d. In the stipulation entered into by the parties, Defendants conceded that 
Carlson was entitled to a termination fee under the terms of the Agreement. The parties 
stipulated that judgment could not be entered because the amount of the fee was contested 
and further discovery was necessary. 
e. Given the totality of the circumstances, Defendants intentionally 
relinquished their right, under Section 4(d) of the Agreement, to object to Carlson's 
deposit of the funds into Court. 
f. Defendants' conduct in so doing constitutes waiver, and Defendants' 
Motion for Directed Verdict on the basis that Carlson's payment into Court did not satisfy 
Section 4(d) of the Agreement, fails as a matter of law. 
2. Based upon the foregoing, effective January 25, 2001, Carlson had satisfied 
its obligation, under Section 4(d) of the Agreement, to pay and deliver the $12,992.74 
amount. 
3. Payment of the termination fee by Defendants was therefore due on February 
24, 2002. 
4. Carlson's damage, as represented by the termination fee, was complete and 
fixed no later than February 24, 2002. 
5. The amount of the termination fee was sufficiently subject to calculation and 
measurement with reference to facts and figures. 
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6. Carlson is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest on the termination fee 
at the rate of 10%, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2), from February 24, 2001 
through the date of Judgment. 
7. However, as a result of Carlson's own excessive miscalculations, it is only 
entitled to prejudgment interest on the amount of $290,617.64, which is the amount 
admitted to by Defendants in their Answer and Counterclaim. 
8. Therefore, prejudgment interest accrues at a rate of $79.62 per day, from 
February 24, 2002 through the date of Judgment. 
DATED this day of November, 2002. 
Approved as to form: 
attorneys for Defendants 
COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of November, 2002, I caused to be mailed, 
first class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the proposed FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AWARD OF 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST to the following: 
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
Scott A. Call, Esq. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
G \Trb\Cariion\poj>ttnal\interest fiiuhngs&cooclu&sous 2 wpd 
1794 18 

% * 
DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENT 
This Distribution Agreement is entered into as of December 15, 1994, between CARLSON 
DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, a Utah corporation ("Distributor") and SALT LAKE BREWING COM 
L.C., a Utah limited liability company ("Brewer"). 
1. DEFINITIONS 
(a) "Agreement" means this Distribution Agreement. 
(b) "Customer" means a person who may lawfully purchase any of the Products from 
Distributor for the purpose of retail sale of the Products to individual consumers. 
(c) "Effective Date" means December 15, 1994. 
(d) "Intellectual Property Rights" means all world-wide patents, patent rights, copyrights, 
copyright registrations, trade secrets, trademarks, service marks, trademark and service 
mark registrations, goodwill pertaining to trademarks and service marks, and confidential 
information. 
(e) "Product(s)" means the beer, ale and lager products manufactured by Brewer and 
identified on Attachment A to this Agreement, as such Products may be modified, 
discontinued, or supplemented from time to time as contemplated by Section 5(d) below 
Initially, Products will be sold to Distributor by the keg only, but Distributor will be 
entitled to purchase Products in whatever size container Brewer manufactures for resale 
to Customers. 
(f) "Territory" means the Counties of Salt Lake and Tooele; in Summit County, the area 
south and east of an imaginary line drawn from the southwest corner of Wyoming to a 
point one mile south of Coalville, and from that point west to the County line; Wasatch 
County, excluding both sides of Highway 6-50 which includes Soldier Summit; Utah 
County, excluding both sides of Highway 6-50 from the Carbon County line to the 
Wasatch County line and that area east thereof; and in Davis County, that portion south 
of an imaginary line drawn east to west between the County lines at the cross roads 
junction of Highways 89 and 106, but not including the junction. 
2. APPOINTMENT OF DISTRIBUTOR 
(a) Appointment of Distributor. Brewer hereby appoints Distributor as its exclusive 
distributor for the Products to Customers within the Territory. 
(b) Acceptance by Distributor. The foregoing appointment is subject to the terms and 
conditions of this Agreement, and Distributor hereby accepts the appointment. 
HI 
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3. DURATION 
(a) Initial Term. The initial term of this Agreement shall begin on the Effective Date and 
shall continue for an initial term of one (1) year, unless sooner terminated as provided 
in Section 4 of this Agreement. 
(b) Extensions. Unless, at least ninety (90) days prior to the end of the initial term or any 
renewal term, a party notifies the other party in writing of its election not to renew this 
Agreement, then this Agreement shall automatically be extended for successive one (1) 
year periods under the same terms and conditions. 
4. TERMINATION 
(a) Termination Upon Failure to Cure Non-Compliance in Accordance with Corrective Action 
Plan. Except as provided in subsection (b) below, Brewer may initiate termination in 
accordance with procedures specified in this subsection (a) if Distributor fails to comply 
with any of its obligations set forth in this Agreement. Brewer shall initiate such 
termination by providing written notice to Distributor which shall specify the nature of 
Distributor's non-compliance and state the date (not less than ninety days) that this 
Agreement shall be terminated. Distributor shall have thirty days from the date of receipt 
of such notice in which to submit a plan of corrective action, and an additional sixty days 
to cure such non-compliance in accordance with such plan. If Distributor fails to submit 
a corrective action plan within said thirty day period, or cure such non-compliance in 
accordance with such plan within said additional sixty day period, Brewer shall have the 
right to terminate this Agreement thereafter upon ten days' written notice. Brewer shall 
have the right to review and approve the corrective action plan, and shall notify 
Distributor, in writing, within ten days of receipt thereof, of any objections which Brewer 
may have with respect to the corrective action plan, and Distributor shall have an 
additional ten days to submit an amended plan for Brewer's approval as aforesaid. The 
amended plan shall then be subject to the approval process as outlined above. 
(b) Other Termination Events. Upon the occurrence of any of the following events with 
respect to a party to this Agreement, the other party, as its sole right and remedy, may 
elect to declare, by written notice to the other party, that the term of this Agreement has 
expired as of the date of occurrence of such event: 
A party has all or a substantial portion of its capital stock or assets 
expropriated or attached by any government entity; 
A party is dissolved or liquidated or files a petition in dissolution or 
liquidation; 
A party has a petition in dissolution or liquidation filed against it, which 
petition is not dismissed within sixty (60) days; 
A party commences any case under the Bankruptcy Code or commences 
any other bankruptcy, arrangement, reorganization, receivership, 
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custodianship, or similar proceeding under any federal, state, or foreign 
law; 
(5) A party has commenced against it any case under the Bankruptcy Code 
or has commenced against it any other bankruptcy, arrangement, 
reorganization, receivership, custodianship, or similar proceeding under 
any federal, state, or foreign law which case or other proceeding is not 
dismissed within sixty (60) days; 
(6) A party is subject to property attachment, court injunction, or court order 
materially affecting its operations or performance under this Agreement; 
(7) A party or any individual owning more than twenty percent (20%) of the 
stock or ownership interests in a party is convicted of or pleads guilty to 
a felony; or 
(8) A party has had its applicable state or federal licenses revoked or 
suspended for more than thirty days. 
(c) Effect of Termination. In the event this Agreement terminates, in addition to any other 
requirements set forth in this Agreement: 
(i) Distributors appointment as a distributor for the Products shall immediately 
terminate and Distributor shall cease all sales and distribution activities; 
(ii) Each party shall promptly pay any amounts due the other hereunder, including 
any damages due if the termination is due to the breach of this Agreement by one 
of the parties; 
(iii) Distributor shall return to Brewer all saleable, unopened inventory of Products, 
and within fifteen (15) days of such return, provided Distributor is not in default. 
Brewer shall reimburse Distributor for the purchase price of such inventory paid 
by Distributor; 
(iv) Provided Brewer is not in default, Distributor shall return to Brewer any and all 
property of Brewer in the possession of Distributor; 
(v) Provided Distributor is not in default, Brewer will refund to Distributor any 
deposit previously placed by Distributor with Brewer which has not been applied; 
and 
(vi) Distributor shall promptly notify all Customers that it no longer is an 
"Authorized Brewer Distributor". 
(d) Termination Fee. In the event Brewer elects not to renew the initial term or any 
successive one year term of this Agreement under Section 3(b) hereof. Brewer shall pay 
to Distributor as liquidated damages and Distributor's sole remedy for such non-renewal 
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(except for any additional amounts payable under Section 4(c) hereof), a termination fee 
which shall be due within thirty days from Distributor's payment (if any) and delivery 
to Brewer of the amounts and property required to be paid or delivered under Section 
4(c) hereof. The amount of said termination fee shall be equal to .75 times Distributor's 
gross profit realized on the sale of Products during the twelve month period immediately 
preceding such notice, but in no event shall such termination fee be less than $25,000. 
(e) Continuing Obligations. All obligations relating to nonuse and nondisclosure of 
confidential information, indemnification, and the obligations of Distributor and Brewer 
with respect to their respective Intellectual Property Rights will survive termination of 
this Agreement for any reason. 
5. LIMITATIONS ON APPOINTMENT 
(a) No Agency. Distributor is an independent contractor and not an agent or employee of 
Brewer. Nothing in this Agreement shall give Distributor the right to represent Brewer 
legally or to undertake any obligation in Brewer's name or for Brewer, and Distributor 
shall always act in its own name and for its own account. Brewer's obligations hereunder 
will be limited to Distributor and will not extend to any Customer, any ultimate consumer 
of the Products, or any other person claiming through Distributor. 
(b) No Assignment. Distributor may hire employees or other agents to perform its 
obligations consistent with the terms and provisions of this Agreement. Distributor shall 
not otherwise assign or delegate any of its rights or obligations hereunder, or enter into 
any sub-distributor agreements, without the prior written consent of Brewer, which shall 
not be unreasonably withheld; provided, however, that (i) Brewer shall be deemed to be 
reasonable in withholding consent to an assignment to any transferee which owns, 
through itself or one or more affiliates, a controlling interest in a brewery and/or 
microbrewery; and (ii) Brewer may make its consent to any such assignment subject to 
(a) the transferee's agreement to be bound by this Agreement, and (b) Brewer's receipt 
of evidence sufficient to establish that said transferee holds all applicable licenses or 
permits and has the financial resources and ability to provide the high level of service and 
performance required by this Agreement. 
(c) No Sales Outside Territory or to other Customers. Distributor will not solicit potential 
Customers outside the Territory or sell or distribute the Products directly or indirectly 
to any geographical area or market other than within the Territory. Distributor shall not 
sell or distribute the Products to any customer or consumer other than a Customer. 
(d) Reservation of Right to Change Product, Price. Brewer reserves the unqualified and 
unilateral right at any time and from time to time, to (i) change, modify and discontinue 
Products described on Attachment A or add additional products to the Products and (ii) 
to modify the price list for the Products for purchase by Distributor. Brewer will inform 
Distributor in writing of any such changes at least thirty (30) days before the effective 
date of any such changes; provided that, if such price change is necessitated by an 
increase in the tax applicable to such Products, said change shall be effective upon the 
effective date for the increase in the tax. Brewer further reserves the right to manage and 
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conduct its business in all respects as Brewer deems appropriate and shall be free at all 
times to maintain or alter the formula, ingredients, labeling or packaging of its Products 
and to make other decisions with respect to its business. 
(e) No Competing Products. Without the express, written consent of Brewer, which consent 
Brewer may withhold in its sole discretion, in consideration of Distributor's appointment 
as a distributor under Section 2 above, Distributor shall not, through itself or one or 
more affiliates, market, sell or represent other microbrewed beer or ale products in draft 
form for sale to Customers or potential Customers in the Territory, other than beer or 
ale products which Distributor currently sells and distributes for Rockies Brewing Co., 
unless Distributor is obligated to distribute such products by one of its national 
distribution accounts or which are brewed outside the State of Utah. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, Distributor may, through itself or one or more affiliates, market, sell or 
represent a product type which Brewer does not produce (the "New Product") if 
Distributor delivers to Brewer written notice of its intent to distribute the New Product 
and Brewer fails to inform Distributor in writing of its intent to produce the New Product 
within thirty days from Brewer's receipt of such notice, or Brewer fails to begin 
production of the New Product within 75 days from Brewer's receipt of such notice. 
(f) No Misrepresentations. Distributor shall not, at any time, during or after the term of this 
Agreement, make any statement, representation, indication or implication that any 
Product is different than as specified in Brewer's documentation or other literature 
provided by Brewer, or otherwise misrepresent the Product. 
ORDERS; TERMS OF PAYMENT 
(a) Purchase Orders. All orders for Products ("Purchase Orders") shall be submitted to 
Brewer on a standard purchase order form approved by Brewer or in such other manner 
as may be approved by Brewer. Purchase Orders not rejected by Brewer in writing 
within seven days shall be deemed accepted. Each Purchase Order, when accepted, shall 
constitute a firm and binding contract, governed by this Agreement, and shall be deemed 
to incorporate and reaffirm Distributor's representations made herein. Unless otherwise 
agreed in writing by both parties, any term contained in a Purchase Order which is 
inconsistent with any term or condition of this Agreement shall be of no force or effect. 
(b) Shipping. Brewer shall deliver the Products covered by a Purchase Order to Distributor, 
F.O.B. Brewer's brewery at 367 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, in accordance 
with the delivery schedule set forth in the accepted Purchase Order. Risk of loss or 
damage to the Products shall pass to Distributor upon such delivery. Distributor shall 
carry adequate insurance to insure against Distributor's risks upon taking delivery of 
Products, as reasonably required by Brewer from time to time, and shall provide Brewer 
with proof of such insurance as reasonably requested by Brewer. Brewer shall deliver 
the Products to Distributor or its agents only. Distributor shall be solely responsible for 
the shipment or delivery of Products to its Customers. 
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(c) Prices to Distributor, Distributor may purchase Products from Brewer in accordance 
with Brewer's then current price list, as adjusted from time to time as specified in 
Section 5(d) hereof. Initially, the per keg price for any of Brewer's Products is $72,00. 
In addition to the per keg price for Products, Distributor will pay Brewer a $12.00 per 
keg "cooperage" fee, for each keg of Products purchased by Distributor. Upon return of 
the empty keg to Brewer in good condition and repair, reasonable wear and tear 
excepted, Distributor shall receive a $12.00 per keg credit. Distributor shall pass the 
$12.00 per keg cooperage fee on to its Customers. 
(d) Terms. Distributor shall pay for all Products purchased within fourteen (14) days 
following the delivery of the Products to Distributor. 
(e) Payments. All payments net of credits shall be made to Brewer in such form as Brewer 
may specify. 
(0 Taxes and other Charges. Brewer will pay all federal and state excise taxes due on the 
production of its Products, and all personal property taxes payable with respect to its 
kegs. 
(g) Absolutely Net. All amounts to be paid to Brewer hereunder are absolute "net" amounts. 
(h) Handling of Products by Distributor. In order to insure the quality and freshness of 
Products sold to Customers and to maintain the good will and reputation of Brewer for 
quality Products, Distributor agrees to comply with Brewer's Quality and Handling 
Requirements set forth on Attachment B to this Agreement, as such Quality and 
Handling Requirements may be modified and supplemented from time to time, upon at 
least five (5) days prior written notice to Distributor. 
7. RESERVED ACCOUNTS/CUSTOMERS 
Brewer may market the Products to customers and other consumers, including Customers, using 
the direct sales personnel of Brewer and Brewer's affiliates; however, all orders from Customers 
in the Territory shall be placed through Distributor and filled by Distributor in accordance with 
the terms of this Agreement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Brewer may market, sell and serve 
the Products at its brew pubs (and transfer Products between its brew pubs) without any 
involvement with or payment to Distributor, 
8. DISTRIBUTOR RESPONSIBILITIES 
Throughout the term of this Agreement, Distributor shall: 
(a) Promotion of Products; Conduct of Business. Use its best efforts and resources to sell 
and service the Products in the Territory and to promote the sale of Products by 
Customers, and to promote and protect the reputation and goodwill of Brewer and its 
Products and to conduct the business of Distributor in a professional manner consistent 
with the business good standing and reputation of both Distributor and Brewer. 
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(b) Labeling. Require each Customer to resell the Products only under the tradenames, 
trademarks, and logos of Brewer, as directed by Brewer from time to time, and in 
compliance with the provisions of Section 10 below. 
(c) Use of Point of Sale Products. Have the right to purchase from Brewer for resale to 
Customers those point-of-sale products, such as napkins, coasters and other items, as 
Brewer may provide from time to time. 
(d) Advertising. Use its best efforts to coordinate with Brewer a professional and 
comprehensive marketing, advertising and promotional plan to sell the Products and to 
promote the purchase and sale of the Products by Customers. Distributor shall submit 
all proposed advertising to Brewer for Brewer's approval prior to use. 
(e) Use of Logo in Connection with Delivery. Without limiting the general requirements of 
Section 8(d) above, allow the placement of Brewer's designated logo, in a form and 
location approved by Brewer, on one of its beer distribution trucks throughout the term 
of this Agreement. Distributor shall be responsible for painting the base/background and 
logo for the truck and pay the costs thereof. The driver of said truck shall wear a 
uniform or t-shirt approved by Brewer and bearing Brewer's logo as part of his weekly 
uniform rotation while making deliveries. Brewer shall make said uniform or t-shirt 
available to Distributor at Brewer's cost. 
(f) Staffing. Ensure that its staff is adequate and competent to promote, sell, and service the 
Products. 
(g) Distributor Representative. Appoint a representative who will be. responsible for 
facilitating the relationship with Brewer and interface with Brewer in all matters. 
(h) Permits and Licenses. Obtain and continuously maintain all permits and licenses 
necessary under federal, state, or local laws, rules, regulations, and ordinances to permit 
Distributor to purchase and distribute the Products to Customers, including, without 
limitation, a Utah beer wholesaling license as required pursuant to Sections 32A-11-101 
et seq., Utah Code Annotated, and shall otherwise comply with all applicable laws, rules, 
regulations, and ordinances, including, without limitation, the provisions of the Utah 
Alcoholic Beverages Code, Title 32A, Utah Code Annotated (the MUtah ABC"), in the 
exercise of its rights and performance of its duties under this Agreement. 
(i) Customer Records. Maintain a complete record of Squatters' Products sold and the prices 
at which the Products are sold. Distributor shall make available to Brewer, on a 
quarterly basis or other periodic basis acceptable to Brewer, a report showing a listing 
of the Customers, Products sold and prices at which Products are sold during the 
applicable period. 
(j) Customer Compliance with Applicable Law. Ensure that each Customer has all necessary 
licenses and permits required under federal, state and local laws, rules, regulations, and 
ordinances to purchase, resell and serve the Products. 
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(k) Tap and Line Cleaning. As necessary, clean all Customer's beer taps and lines to assure 
free flow of beer products. Distributor shall not clean taps and lines for any party whose 
products Distributor is prohibited from distributing under Section 5(e) hereof, without 
Brewer's prior written consent. 
9. BREWER RESPONSIBILITIES 
Throughout the term of this Agreement, Brewer shall: 
(a) Delivery of Products. Deliver to Distributor, FOB Brewer's brewery at 367 West 200 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, Products ordered by Distributor pursuant to Section 6(a) 
of this Agreement. 
(b) Point of Sale Products. Make available point-of-sale products, such as napkins and 
coasters, at such prices as Brewer shall establish from time to time. 
(c) Tap Handles. Supply Distributor with a reasonable number of tap handles for each of 
Distributor's Customers, at no initial cost. If the Customer requires any replacement tap 
handles, the Customer will be furnished a replacement by Brewer. When the relationship 
with a particular Customer ends, Distributor shall use its best efforts to cause the 
Customer to return to Brewer the same number of tap handles originally provided by 
Brewer for that Customer, in good condition and repair, reasonable wear and tear 
excepted. 
(d) Brewer Representative. Appoint a representative who will be responsible for facilitating 
the relationship with Distributor and interface with Distributor in all matters. 
(e) Product Liability Insurance. Maintain product liability insurance in an amount not less 
than $1,000,000, with an insurer acceptable to Distributor, and shall furnish to 
Distributor a certificate of insurance naming Distributor as an additional insured thereon. 
10. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
(a) Distributor's and Customers7 Rights. Distributor is hereby granted the non-exclusive, 
non-assignable privilege to use, and to permit Customers to use, Brewer's trademarks, 
tradenames, and logos designated from time to time by Brewer for such use in connection 
with the advertising, distribution, display and sale of the Products; however, Distributor 
is not acquiring any proprietary interest whatsoever in any of the trademarks, tradenames, 
or logos or other Intellectual Property Rights associated with the Products, other than as 
specifically provided in this Agreement. Upon termination of this Agreement, Distributor 
shall immediately cease any use of Brewer's trademarks, tradenames, and logos. 
Distributor acknowledges that Brewer owns and retains all of its rights in such 
trademarks, tradenames, logos and other Intellectual Property Rights associated with the 
Products and in any goodwill arising out of the marketing efforts performed by 
Distributor or any Customer. The rights granted in this Section 10 shall terminate upon 
termination of this Agreement. Brewer hereby indemnifies Distributor and holds 
Distributor harmless from and against any and all infringement claims asserted by third 
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parties against Distributor pertaining to Distributor's use of the trademarks, tradenames 
and logos hereunder. 
(b) Prohibited Uses and Restrictions. 
(i) Distributor may not sell or distribute any of the Products other than in the 
packaging provided or approved by Brewer or remove identifying marks 
provided by Brewer on kegs or other containers of the Products, if any. 
(ii) Distributor agrees to remove all of Brewer's trademarks, tradenames, and logos 
affixed in any fashion to property owned or controlled by Distributor (including 
vehicles, equipment, and office supplies) upon termination of this Agreement or 
before leasing, selling or otherwise transferring such property or control thereof 
to another person or putting such property to any use not connected with the 
distribution of the Products. 
(c) Permitted Uses. Distributor and the Customers may only use the designated trademarks, 
tradenames, and logos of Brewer to identify the Products. Such use is subject to 
compliance by Distributor and each Customer with Brewer's trademark usage policies as 
provided by Brewer to Distributor in writing from time to time. Distributor and each 
Customer shall make samples of Distributor's and such Customer's use of Brewer 
trademarks, tradenames, and logos available to Brewer upon request. Upon Brewer's 
request, Distributor and the Customers will change or discontinue the way in which they 
use any of Brewer's trademarks, tradenames, or logos, 
(d) Identification. Distributor may identify itself as an "Exclusive Authorized Brewer 
Distributor." Upon termination of this Agreement, Distributor shall immediately cease 
to identify itself as an "Exclusive Authorized Brewer Distributor." 
11. LIMITED PRODUCT WARRANTIES 
(a) Warranties. Brewer warrants that all of the Products will be manufactured and packaged 
in compliance with applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations, that Brewer 
has all necessary licenses and permits required to manufacture and sell the Products to 
Distributor, and that the Products, as packaged and delivered to Distributor, are fit for 
human consumption. 
(b) Breach of Warranty. In the event of any breach of the foregoing warranties, Brewer, at 
its own expense, will replace the Product with Products that comply with the warranty 
obligations. Brewer hereby indemnifies Distributor and holds it harmless from and 
against all claims arising from any breach by Brewer of the foregoing warranties. 
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12. ADDITIONAL WARRANTIES. 
(a) Brewer Warranties. Brewer makes the following representations and warranties, which 
are true and correct as of the date hereof and shall be true and correct throughout the 
term of this Agreement: 
(i) Brewer is a limited liability company duly organized, validly existing and in good 
standing under the laws of the State of Utah and has full power and authority to 
own, lease and operate the properties used in its business and to carry on its 
business as now being conducted. 
(ii) This Agreement has been duly and validly authorized, executed and delivered by, 
and is the valid and binding obligation of, Brewer. The execution, delivery and 
performance of this Agreement by Brewer is in compliance with all applicable 
federal, state and local laws or regulations. 
(iii) Brewer is solvent, has assets in excess of its liabilities, is paying its debts as they 
become due and does not plan to incur debts in excess of its ability to pay when 
due. 
(b) Distributor Warranties. Distributor makes the following representations and warranties, 
which are true and correct as of the date hereof and shall be true and correct throughout 
the term of this Agreement: 
Distributor is a corporation duly organized, validly existing and in good standing 
under the laws of the State of Utah and has full corporate power and authority 
to own, lease and operate the. properties used in its business and to carry on its 
business as now being conducted. 
This Agreement has been duly and validly authorized, executed and delivered by, 
and is the valid and binding obligation of, Distributor. The execution, delivery 
and performance of this Agreement by Distributor is in compliance with all 
applicable federal, state and local laws or regulations. 
Distributor is solvent, has assets in excess of its liabilities, is paying its debts as 
they become due and does not plan to incur debts in excess of its ability to pay 
when due. 
Distributor has all permits and licenses necessary to sell and distribute the 
Products in the Territory, including a current Utah beer wholesaling license, and 
is in compliance with all requirements relating to such license. The operations 
and business of Distributor do not violate the Utah ABC, and Distributor has 
never been cited for violation of any provision of the Utah ABC or received any 
formal or informal notice or warning of a violation or potential violation of the 
Utah ABC. 
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(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
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13. INDEMNIFICATION 
Distributor shall be exclusively responsible for resolving any claims made against it relating to 
the Products and will use its best endeavors to do so. Distributor agrees to indemnify, defend 
and hold Brewer harmless for, from and against any claims, damages or litigation cost resulting 
from claims based on Distributor's breach of its obligations hereunder. Brewer agrees to 
indemnify, defend and hold Distributor harmless for, from and against any claims, damages or 
litigation cost resulting from claims based on Brewer's breach of its obligations hereunder. 
14. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
Unless compelled by legal process or required by applicable law and except as otherwise required 
to satisfy the requirements of this Agreement, Brewer and Distributor shall not disclose at any 
time, whether during the continuance of this Agreement or after its termination, to any person, 
firm or corporation any confidential information (including the terms of this Agreement), 
belonging to the other party in any manner whatsoever. 
15. FORCE MAJEURE 
Neither party shall be liable to the other for delays in or failure of performance due to causes 
beyond such party's reasonable control, or acts of God, acts of civil or military authority, 
priorities under governmental authority, fires, floods, epidemics, war, embargo, riots or national 
company strikes or other causes beyond the control of the affected party. 
16. GENERAL 
(a) Headings; Construction. Captions and headings are for convenience only and shall not 
affect the construction or interpretation of any provisions of this Agreement. All 
Attachments to this Agreement are incorporated by reference and are a part hereof. 
(b) Survival of Rights. The rights and obligations of the parties under Sections 4, 10, 11, 
13 and 14 of this Agreement, the obligation to pay any amounts owed hereunder, and any 
other obligations which logically continue following a termination will survive and 
continue after termination of this Agreement, and will bind the parties, their successors 
and permitted assigns. 
(c) Amendment. Except as otherwise provided herein, this Agreement can only be modified 
by written agreement duly signed by persons authorized to sign agreements on behalf of 
Distributor and Brewer. 
(d) Successors and Assigns. This Agreement will inure to the benefit of and be binding upon 
the parties hereto and their respective successors and permitted assigns, and not to the 
benefit of anyone else. Each party acknowledges that it has read this Agreement, 
understands it, and agrees to be bound by its terms and conditions, and that this 
Agreement contains the complete and exclusive statement of the entire agreement of both 
parties. THIS AGREEMENT MAY NOT BE CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE OF 
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ANY ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT. ALL PRIOR ORAL DISCUSSIONS ARE 
MERGED IN THIS AGREEMENT. 
(e) Governing Law. This Agreement will be governed by the laws of the United States of 
America and the State of Utah, excluding that body of law pertaining to choice of law. 
If any provision of this Agreement is found invalid or unenforceable, it will be enforced 
to the maximum extent permissible, and the legality and enforceability of the other 
provisions of this Agreement will not be affected, 
(f) Notices. All notices or communications will be in writing and given by facsimile 
transmission with a copy mailed by first class mail or its equivalent, postage prepaid, or 
by personal delivery, at the applicable address shown on the signature page hereof, or 
to such other place as the parties hereto from time to time may direct. Notice will be 
properly given on the date of facsimile transmission or on the date of delivery, whichever 
applies. 
(g) Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which will be 
deemed an original, but all of which together will constitute one and the same agreement, 
even if the parties have not signed the same counterpart. 
(h) Attorneys' Fees. If any action is brought by either party in respect to its rights under this 
Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and court 
costs as determined by the court. 
(i) Waivers. No waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall constitute a waiver 
of any other provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver be a continuing 
waiver. Except as expressly provided in this Agreement, no waiver shall be binding 
unless executed in writing by the party making the waiver. Either party may waive any 
provision of this Agreement intended for its benefit; provided, however, such waiver 
shall in no way excuse the other party from the performance of any of its other 
obligations under this Agreement. 
DISTRIBUTOR: 
CARLSON 
a Utah co/porai 
L 
By: 
ne: 
Address: 1864 South 3730 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Attn: 
Fax: (801) 973-9270 
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BREWER: 
SALT LAKE BREWING CO., L.C.. 
a Utah limit^dflSabluty^ompany 
Name: 
Title: ' hM/PrC^C. 
~(crtm.\ 
Address: 375 West 200 South, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Fax: 
Attn: Jeff Polychronis 
(801) 359-5426 
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ATTACHMENT A 
Description of Products 
Squatter's Hop Head Red 
Squatter's Hefeweizen 
Such other Products as Brewer may produce from time to time. 
SLCI-N1ELSEG- 25896.5 14 
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ATTACHMENT B 
Quality and Handling Requirements 
1. Distributor shall use all reasonable care and caution when handling kegs, including the 
use of Mkeg drop bumpers," when necessary. 
2. Distributor is responsible for rotating Products in and out of its warehouse and at the 
customer's location, to insure that no Products are sold to Customers or by Customers to consumers 
beyond the expiration date shown on the keg. Products that are past the expiration date shall be disposed 
of by Distributor or returned to Brewer for disposal, as may be specified by Brewer. Brewer shall apply 
for all tax rebates related to the sale of outdated Products disposed of by Distributor and shall credit such 
amounts to Distributor's account. 
SLCl-NIELSEG-25896.5 15 
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CALCULATION OF LOST PROFITS 
I. CARLSON'S SALES TREND FOR JAN-JUNE 2000 
a. Full Strength Cases: +8% 
b. Packaged Beer: +40% 
c. Draft Beer:-20.53% 
II. PROJECTED SALES AND PROFITS FOR 7/1/2000 - 12/31/2000 
a. Full Strength Cases (1999=1403): 1515 @ $3.61 $5,469.15 
b. Packaged Beer (1999 = 25,270) 
25,190 6-pack cases @ $5.59 140,812.10 
10,188 12-pack cases @ $5.45 55,524.60 
c. Draft (1999=2928) 2,327 @ $27.50 63.992.50 
TOTAL $265,798.35 
III. ESTIMATED LOST PROFITS FOR 8/1/2000 - 12/14/2000 
Lost profit per month = $44299.73 x 4.5 months $199,348.50 
IV. LESS PROFITS ON SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS 
a. Boulder Draft Beer: 52 kegs @ 27.00 $1,404.00 
b. Park City Draft Beer 
307 kegs @ $24.00 7,368.00 
89 mini-kegs @ $10.00 890.00 
c. Moab Draft Beer 
232 kegs @ $23.75 5,510.00 
174 mini-kegs @ $9.95 1,731.00 
TOTAL ($16,903.10) 
V. TOTAL LOST PROFIT ft 187. 444.50 
| g PLAINTIFF'S 
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32A-lla-101 ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL ACT 
tained, or preserved by this title or the rules of the commission for the 
purpose of deceiving the commission or the department, or any of their 
officials or employees, is subject to the immediate suspension or revocation 
of the beer wholesaling license and possible criminal prosecution under 
Chapter 12, Criminal Offenses. 
(g) A licensee may not assign or transfer its license unless the assign-
ment or transfer is done in accordance with the commission rules and after 
written consent has been given by the commission. 
(h) A licensee may not sell or distribute any alcoholic beverage that is 
not clearly labeled in a manner reasonably calculated to put the public on 
notice that the beverage is an alcoholic beverage. The beverage shall bear 
the label "alcoholic beverage" or a manufacturer's label which hi common 
usage apprises the general public that the beverage contains alcohol. 
(2) Failure to comply with the provisions of Subsection (1) may result in 
suspension or revocation of the beer wholesaling license or other disciplinary 
action taken against individual employees or management personnel of the 
licensee. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-10-6, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 1; renum-
bered by L. 1990, ch. 23, § 124; 1991, ch. 
132, § 36; 1994, ch. 88, § 10; 2000, ch. 1, § 83. 
Amendment Notes . — The 2000 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 2000, in Subsection dXf) 
substituted "commission or the department" for 
"commission, council, or department" and 
added "Criminal Offenses." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Authorized purchasers . 
Wholesalers may sell light beer only to li-
censed dealers; they cannot sell to consumers. 
Shaw v. Orem City, 117 Utah 288, 214 R2d 888 
(1950) (decided under former law). 
CHAPTER 11a 
UTAH BEER INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTION 
ACT 
Section 
32A-lla-101. Title — Legislative intent. 
32A-lla-102. Definitions. 
32A-lla-103. Termination of distributorship 
agreements. 
32A-lla-104. Notice of termination. 
32A-lla-105. Prohibited conduct of supplier. 
32A-lla-106. Prohibited conduct of whole-
saler. 
32A-lla-107. Sale or transfer of business 
assets or ownership. 
Section 
32A-Ha-108. 
32A-Ila-109. 
32A-lla-110. 
32A- l la - l l l . 
Reasonable compensation — 
Arbitration. 
Sale or transfer of supplier's 
business. 
Judicial remedies. 
Modifying statutory require-
ments not permitted. 
32A-lla-101. Title — Legislative intent. 
(1) This chapter shall be known as the "Utah Beer Industry Distribution 
Act." 
(2) (a) It is the policy of the Legislature to regulate and control the 
importation, sale, and distribution of beer within the state in the exercise 
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of its powers under the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and pursuant to the Utah Constitution. 
(b) In furtherance of the policy described in Subsection (2)(a), this 
chapter is enacted to: 
(i) promote good faith and fair dealing in the business relationships 
between suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers of beer; and 
(ii) provide for the establishment and maintenance of an orderly 
system for the distribution of beer in accordance with the laws of the 
state regulating the sale and distribution of beer to the public. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-101, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 328, § 13 
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 1. makes the act effective on July 1, 1998. 
32A-lla-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Affected party" means a supplier or wholesaler who is a party to a 
distributorship agreement that a terminating party seeks to terminate or 
not renew. 
(2) (a) "Distributorship agreement" means any written contract, agree-
ment, or arrangement between a supplier and a wholesaler pursuant 
to which the wholesaler has the right to purchase, resell, and 
distribute in a designated geographical area any brand of beer 
manufactured, imported, or distributed by the supplier. 
(b) A separate agreement between a supplier and a wholesaler that 
relates to the relationship between the supplier and the wholesaler or 
the duties of either of them under a distributorship agreement is 
considered to be part of the distributorship agreement for purposes of 
this chapter. 
(c) A distributorship agreement may be for a definite or indefinite 
period. 
(3) "Good cause" means the material failure by a supplier or a whole-
saler to comply with an essential, reasonable, and lawful requirement 
imposed by a distributorship agreement if the failure occurs after the 
supplier or wholesaler acting in good faith provides notice of deficiency 
and an opportunity to correct in accordance with Sections 32A-lla-103 
and 32A-lla-104. 
(4) "Good faith" is as defined in Section 70A-2-103. 
(5) "Retailer" means a person subject to license under Chapter 10, Beer 
Retailer Licenses. 
(6) "Sales territory" means the geographic area of distribution and sale 
responsibility designated by a distributorship agreement. 
(7) "Supplier," notwithstanding Section 32A-1-105, means a brewer or 
other person who sells beer to a wholesaler for resale in this state. 
(8) "Terminating party" means a supplier or wholesaler who: 
(a) is a party to a distributorship agreement;, and 
(b) seeks to terminate or not renew the distributorship agreement. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-102, enacted by tion 32A-1-105" for "Section 32A-1-107" in Sub-
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 2; 2000, ch. 1, § 84. section (7). 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 328, § 13 
ment, effective May 1, 2000, substituted "Sec- makes the act effective on July 1, 1998. 
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32A-lla-103. Termination of distributorship agreements, 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2) or (3), a supplier or wholesaler may 
not: 
(a) terminate a distributorship agreement; or 
(b) fail to renew a distributorship agreement. 
(2) A supplier or wholesaler may take an action prohibited by Section (1) if: 
(a) the supplier or wholesaler has good cause for the action; and 
(b) if notification is required by Section 32A-lla-104: 
(i) the terminating party provides the affected party prior notifica-
tion in accordance with Section 32A-lla-104; and 
(ii) the affected party has not eliminated the reasons specified in 
the notification as the reasons for the action within 90 days after the 
date the notification is mailed in accordance with Section 32A-lla-
104. 
(3) A supplier may terminate or not renew a distributorship agreement if: 
(a) the supplier gives the wholesaler 30 days written notice before 
termination or nonrenewal; 
(b) the supplier discontinues production or discontinues distribution 
throughout the state of all brands of beer sold by the supplier to the 
wholesaler; and 
(c) the termination or nonrenewal does not violate the distributorship 
agreement. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-103, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 328, § 13 
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 3. makes the act effective on July 1, 1998. 
32A-lla-104. Notice of termination. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), a terminating party may not take 
an action described in Subsection 32A- 11a-103(1) unless the terminating party 
provides prior notification in accordance with Subsection (2) to the affected 
party. 
(2) The notification required under Subsection (1) shall: 
(a) be in writing; 
(b) be mailed by registered mail, return receipt requested, to the 
affected party not less than 90 days before the date on which the 
distributorship agreement will be terminated or not renewed; 
(c) state the intention to terminate or not renew; 
(d) state the reasons for the termination or nonrenewal; and 
(e) state the date, not less than 90 days from the date of mailing, on 
which the termination or nonrenewal shall take effect if the reasons for 
the action are not eliminated by that date. 
(3) A supplier or wholesaler may take an action described in Subsection 
32A-lla-103(l) without furnishing any prior notification if: 
(a) the affected party is insolvent, bankrupt, in dissolution, or in 
liquidation; 
(b) the affected party makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors 
or similar disposition of substantially all of the assets of the affected 
party's business; 
(c) the affected party or a person owning more than 10% of the stock or 
other ownership interest in the affected party: 
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(i) is convicted of, pleads guilty to, or pleads no contest to a felony 
under the laws of the United States or this state that in the 
reasonable, good faith judgment of the terminating party materially 
and adversely affects the good will or business of the terminating 
party; 
(ii) has its license or permit revoked or suspended for a period of 31 
days or more; or 
(iii) engages in intentional fraudulent conduct in its dealings with 
the terminating party that in the reasonable, good faith judgment of 
the terminating party materially and adversely affects the good will 
or business of the terminating party. 
(4) Subsection (3)(c)(iii) does not apply to conduct by a non-owner employee 
or representative of the affected party if the conduct occurred without the prior 
knowledge or consent of an owner of the affected party 
(5) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(c)(i), a supplier may not take an action 
under Subsection (3)(c)(i) because of a conviction or plea by an owner of the 
affected party, if: 
(a) any other approved owner of the affected party purchases the 
ownership interest of the offending owner; 
(b) the offending owner was not materially involved in the management 
of the affected party; and 
(c) the purchase described in Subsection (5)(a) is completed within 90 
days after the conviction or plea. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-104, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch 328, § 13 
L. 3998, ch. 328, § 4. makes the act effective on July 1, 1998. 
32A-lla-105. Prohibi ted conduct of supplier. 
(1) A supplier may not: 
(a) induce, coerce, or attempt to induce or coerce, any wholesaler to 
engage in any illegal act or course of conduct; 
(b) impose a requirement that is discriminatory by its terms or in the 
methods of enforcement as compared to requirements imposed by the 
supplier on similarly situated wholesalers; 
(c) prohibit a wholesaler from selling the product of any other supplier; 
(d) fix or maintain the price at which a wholesaler may resell beer; 
(e) fail to execute with each wholesaler of its brands a written distribu-
torship agreement; 
(f) require any wholesaler to accept delivery of any beer or any other 
item that is not voluntarily ordered by the wholesaler; 
(g) restrict or inhibit, directly or indirectly, the right of a wholesaler to 
participate in an organization representing interests of wholesalers for 
any lawful purpose; 
(h) require a wholesaler to participate in or contribute to any local, 
regional, or national advertising fund or other promotional activity that: 
(i) is not used for advertising or promotional activities in the 
wholesaler's sales territory; or 
(ii) would require contributions by the wholesaler in excess of the 
amounts specified in the distributorship agreement; 
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(i) retaliate against a wholesaler that files a complaint with the 
department or the applicable federal agency regarding an alleged violation 
by the supplier of a state or federal law or administrative rule; 
(j) require without good cause any change in the manager of a whole-
saler who has previously been approved by the supplier; 
(k) if a wholesaler changes its approved manager, prohibit the change 
unless the new manager fails to meet the reasonable standards for 
similarly situated wholesalers of the supplier as stated in the distributor-
ship agreement; or 
(1) refuse to deliver beer products covered by a distributorship agree-
ment to the wholesaler: 
(i) in reasonable quantities; and 
(iij within a reasonable time after receipt of the wholesaler's order. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1X1), the supplier may refuse to deliver 
products if the refusal is due to: 
(a) the wholesaler's failure to pay the supplier pursuant to the distribu-
torship agreement; 
(b) an unforeseeable event beyond the supplier's control; 
(c) a work stoppage or delay due to a strike or labor problem; 
(d) a bona fide shortage of materials; or 
(e) a freight embargo. 
History: C. 1953,32A-lla-105. enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch 328, § 13 
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 5. * makes the act effective on July 1, 1998 
32A-lla-106. Prohibi ted conduct of wholesaler, 
(1) A wholesaler may not: 
(a) induce, coerce, or attempt to induce or coerce, any retailer to engage 
in any illegal act or course of conduct; 
(b) impose a requirement that is discriminatory by its terms or in the 
methods of enforcement as compared to requirements imposed by the 
wholesaler on similarly situated retailers; 
(c) prohibit a retailer from selling the product of any other wholesaler, 
(d) fix or maintain the price at which a retailer may resell beer; 
(e) require any retailer to accept delivery of any beer or any other item 
that is not voluntarily ordered by the retailer; 
({) restrict or inhibit, directly or indirectly, the right of a retailer to 
participate in an organization representing interests of retailers for any 
lawful purpose; 
(g) require a retailer to participate in or contribute to any local, 
regional, or national advertising fund or other promotional activity; 
(h) retaliate against a retailer that files a complaint with the depart-
ment or the applicable federal agency regarding an alleged violation by the 
wholesaler of a state or federal law or administrative rule; 
(i) refuse to deliver beer products carried by the wholesaler to a 
properly licensed retailer who resides wTithin the wholesaler's sales 
territory: 
(i) in reasonable quantities; and 
(ii) within a reasonable time after receipt of the retailer's order. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(i), the wholesaler may refuse to deliver 
products if the refusal is clue to: 
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(a) the retailer's failure to pay the wholesaler pursuant to Subsection 
32A-12-603U7); 
(b) an unforeseeable event beyond the wholesaler's control; 
(c) a work stoppage or delay due to a strike or labor problem; 
(d) a bona fide shortage of materials; or 
(e) a freight embargo. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-106, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 328, § 13 
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 6. makes the act effective on July 1, 1998. 
32A-lla-107. Sale or transfer of business assets or owner-
ship. 
(1) Without the prior written approval of a sale or transfer by the supplier: 
(a) a wholesaler may not sell or transfer its business, or any portion of 
its business, including the distributorship agreement to a successor in 
interest; and 
(b) the owner of an interest in a wholesaler may not sell or transfer all 
or part of the owner's interest in the wholesaler to a successor in interest. 
(2) A supplier may not unreasonably withhold or delay its approval of a sale 
or transfer, including the wholesaler's rights and obligations under the terms 
of the distributorship agreement, if the person to be substituted meets 
reasonable standards that are imposed: 
(a) by the supplier pursuant to the distributorship agreement; and 
(b) on other wholesalers of tha t supplier of the same general class, 
taking into account the size and location of the sales territory and market 
to be served. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a wholesaler may not assign or transfer 
its license in violation of Subsection 32A-ll-106(l)(g), 
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-107, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch 328, § 13 
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 7. makes the act effective on July 1, 1998 
32A-lla-108. Reasonable compensation — Arbitration. 
(1) If a supplier violates Section 32A-lla-103 or 32A-lla-107, the supplier 
shall be liable to the wholesaler for the laid-in cost of inventory of the affected 
brands plus any diminution in the fair market value of the wholesaler^ 
business with relation to the affected brands. In determining fair market 
value, consideration shall be given to all elements of value, including good will 
and going concern value. 
(2) (a) A distributorship agreement may require that any or all disputes 
between a supplier and a wholesaler be submitted to binding arbitration. 
In the absence of an applicable arbitration provision in the distributorship 
agreement, either the supplier or the wholesaler may request arbitration 
if a supplier and a wholesaler are unable to mutually agree on: 
(i) whether or not good cause exists for termination or nonrenewal; 
(ii) whether or not the supplier unreasonably withheld approval of 
a sale or transfer under Section 32A-lla-107; or 
(iii) the reasonable compensation to be paid for the value of the 
wholesaler's business in accordance with Subsection (1). 
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(b) If a supplier or wholesaler requests arbitration under Subsection 
(2)Ca) and the other party agrees to submit the matter to arbitration, an 
arbitration panel shall be created with the following members: 
(i) one member selected by the supplier in a writing delivered to the 
wholesaler within ten business days of the date arbitration was 
requested under Subsection (2)(a); 
(ii) one member selected by the wholesaler in a writing delivered to 
the supplier within ten business days of the date arbitration was 
requested under Subsection (2)(a); and 
(iii) one member selected by the two arbitrators appointed under 
Subsections (2)(b)(i) and (ii). 
(c) If the arbitrators selected under Subsection (2)(b)(iii) fail to choose a 
third arbitrator within ten business days of their selection, a judge of a 
district court in the county in which the wholesaler's principal place of 
business is located shall select the third arbitrator. 
(dj Arbitration costs shall be divided equally between the wholesaler 
and the supplier. 
(e) The award of the arbitration panel is binding on the parties unless 
appealed within 20 days from the date of the award. 
(f) Subject to the requirements of this chapter, arbitration and all 
proceedings on appeal shall be governed by Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah 
Arbitration Act. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-108, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1998. ch 328, § 13 
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 8. makes the act effective on July 1, 1998 
32A-lla-109. Sale or transfer of supplier's business. 
(1) (a) Asuccessor to a supplier that after July 1,1998, acquires a supplier's 
products or brands in this state shall be bound by all of the terms and 
conditions of each distributorship agreement with a wholesaler in this 
state that was in effect on the date on which the successor received the 
assets or rights of the previous supplier. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection d)(a), a successor may contractually 
require its wholesalers to: 
(i) execute a new distributorship agreement; and 
(ii) comply with the successor's operational standards of perfor-
mance if: 
(A) the operational standards of performance are consistent 
with this chapter; 
(B) the operational standards of performance are uniformly 
imposed by the successor on similarly situated wholesalers; and 
(C) the successor provides the wholesaler at least one year to: 
(I) execute a new distributorship agreement, and 
(II) comply with the operational standards of performance. 
(2) (a) For purposes of this section, "successor" means a supplier who 
obtains the distribution rights of a brand that a wholesaler distributes in 
this state pursuant to a distributorship agreement v/ith another supplier 
who previously had the distribution rights of the brand. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (2)(a), the successor may obtain the 
distribution right: 
(i) by any means, including: 
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(A) merger; 
(B) purchase of corporate shares; or 
(C) purchase of assets; and 
(ii) from: 
(A) a supplier; or 
(B) a person acting in an official capacity who is not a supplier 
including a nominee, representative, or fiduciary. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-109, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 328, § 13 
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 9. makes the act effective on July 1, 1998. 
32A-lla-110. Judicial remedies. 
(1) A supplier or wholesaler who is a party to a distributorship agreement 
may maintain a civil action against the supplier or wholesaler in a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the county in which the wholesaler's principal place 
of business is located if: 
(a) the supplier or wholesaler violates this chapter; or 
(b) (i) the supplier and wholesaler are not able to mutually agree on 
reasonable compensation under Section 32A-lla-108; and 
(ii) the parties do not agree to submit the matter to arbitration in 
accordance with Section 32A-lla-108 prior to or within 20 days 
following service of process on the electing party in the civil action. 
(2) (a) The prevailing party in any action under Subsection (1) shall 
recover: 
(i) actual damages, including the value of the wholesaler's business 
as specified in Section 32A-lla-108 if applicable; and 
(ii) reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. 
(b) In addition to the amount awarded under Subsection (2)(a), the 
court may grant such relief in law or equity as the court determines to be 
necessary or appropriate considering the purposes of this chapter. 
(3) If either party elects arbitration under Subsection (l)(b)(ii) following 
service of process, the civil action is stayed pending a decision by the 
arbitration panel. 
History: C. 1953,32A-lla-110, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 328, § 13 
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 10. makes the act effective on July 1, 1998. 
32A-lla-l l l . Modifying statutory requirements not per-
mitted. 
(1) Nothing in this chapter is intended to restrict the right of a supplier to 
contractually require its wholesaler to comply with the supplier's operational 
standards of performance that are: 
(a) consistent with this chapter; and 
(b) uniformly established for its wholesalers according to the supplier's 
good faith business judgment. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the requirements of this chapter may 
not be modified by agreement. 
(3) Any agreement that by its terms modifies the requirements of this 
chapter is void and unenforceable to the extent it attempts to modify the 
requirements of this chapter. 
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History: C. 1953, 3 2 A - l l a - l l l , enacted by 
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 11. 
Severabil ity Clauses. — Laws 1998, ch. 
328, § 12 provides: "If any provision of this act, 
or the application of any provision to any per-
son or circumstance, is held invalid, the re-
mainder of this act is given effect without the 
invalid provision or application." 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 328, § 13 
makes the act effective on July 1, 1998. 
CHAPTER 12 
CRIMINAL OFFENSES 
Part i 
G e n e r a l P rov i s ions 
Section 
32A-12-101. 
32A-12-102. 
32A-12-103. 
32A-12-104. 
32A-12-105. 
Utah Criminal Code applicable. 
Special burdens of proof — In-
ferences and presumptions. 
Criminal responsibility for con-
duct of another. 
Violation of title a misde-
meanor. 
Additional criminal penalties. 
P a r t 2 
Sale, P u r c h a s e , Possess ion , s.nd 
C o n s u m p t i o n 
32A-12-201. Unlawful sale or supply. 
32A-12-202. Unauthorized sale or supply. 
32A-12-203. Unlawful sale or supply to mi-
nors. 
32A-12-204. Unlawful sale or supply to in-
toxicated persons. 
32A-12-205. Unlawful sale or supply to inter-
dicted persons. 
32A-12-206. Unlawful sale or supply of beer. 
32A-12-207. Unlawful sale or supply during 
emergency. 
32A-12-208. Unlawful purchase or accep-
tance. 
32A-12-209. Unlawful purchase, possession, 
or consumption by minors. 
32A-12-210. Unlawful purchase by intoxi-
cated persons. 
32A-12-211. Unlawful purchase by inter-
dicted persons. 
32A-12-212. Unlawful possession - - Excep-
tions. 
32A-12-213. Unlawful bringing onto pre-
mises for consumption. 
32A-12-214. Unlawful possession by licens-
ees or permittees. 
32A-12-215. Unlawful storage. 
32A-12-216. Unlawful permitting of intoxi-
cation. 
32A-12-217. Unlawful permitting of con-
sumption by minors. 
32A-12-218. Unlawful labeling or lack of la-
bel. 
32A-12-219. Unlawful adulteration. 
Section 
32A-12-220. Unlawful consumption in public 
places. 
32A-12-221. Lawful detention. 
Part 3 
Operations 
32A-12-301. Operating without a license or 
permit. 
32A-12-302. Storing or possessing pursuant 
to federal stamp. 
32A-12-303. Tampering with records. 
32A-12-304. Making false statements. 
32A-12-305. Obstructing an officer making a 
search or an official proceed-
ing or investigation. 
32A-12-306. Conflicting interests. 
32A-12-307. Interfering with suppliers. 
32A-12-308. Offering or soliciting bribes or 
gifts. 
32A-12-309. Organizing for pecuniary profit. 
32A-12-310. Forgery. 
Part 4 
Adver t i s ing and Sol ic i t ing 
32A-12-401. Advertising prohibited — Ex-
ceptions. 
32A-12-402, 32A-12-403. Repealed. 
P a r t 5 
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and Distribution 
32A-12-501. Disposition of liquor items 
shipped to the department. 
32A-1.2-502. Unlawful removal from convey-
ance or diversion of ship-
ments. 
32A-12-503. Unlawful importations. 
32A-12-504. Unlawful transportation. 
32A-12-505. Lawful transportation. 
32A-12-506. Carriers' records. 
P a r t 6 
Trade Pract ices 
32A-12-601. Definitions. 
32A-12-602. Exclusive outlets. 
32A-12-603. Tied house — Prohibition — Re-
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